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INTRODUCTION
HEN the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights (U.N. Sub-Commission)
adopted Resolution 2000/7 on "Intellectual Property Rights
and Human Rights"' more than fifteen years ago, issues lying at the inter-
section of intellectual property and human rights were underexplored. 2
As Laurence Helfer aptly described, "human rights law [wa]s intellectual
property's new frontier."'3 Since then, however, the area has received con-
siderable attention. Today, one can easily find books and law review arti-
cles on the subject.4 Although these discussions have focused mostly on
topics such as access to essential medicines,5 access to knowledge, 6 and
1. Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, Intellectual Property Rights and
Human Rights, 52d Sess., July 31-Aug. 18, 2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7
(Aug. 17, 2000), http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/SRHRL/PDF/IHRDArticlel5/E-
CN_4-SUB_2-RES-2000-7_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/DDQ3-A6S5] [hereinafter Resolu-
tion 2000/7].
2. As Professors Laurence Heifer and Graeme Austin explained:
Human rights law ... offered neither a necessary nor a sufficient justification
for state-granted monopolies in intangible knowledge goods; nor, conversely,
did it serve to check the expansion of intellectual property protection stan-
dards.... [To a great extent,] each legal regime was preoccupied with its own
distinct concerns and neither saw the other as either aiding or threatening its
sphere of influence or opportunities for expansion.
LAURE-NCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSIiN, HUMAN RiGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPEWY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 33-34 (2011).
3. Laurence R. Heifer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT.'. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Helfer, New
Innovation Frontier?].
4. For book-length studies on intellectual property and human rights, see generally
HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 2; INTELIEIJCIUAL PROPIERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul
L.C. Torremans ed., 3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter INTLLc.CFUAL PROPIRTY AND HUMAN
RIGIITS]; INTELLECTIUAL PROPERTiY AND HUMAN RIGIITs: A PARADOX (Willem
Grosheide ed., 2010) [hereinafter A PARADOX]; RESEARcui HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGIITS AND INTE-!LECTUAL P.o! RT-Y (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) [hereinafter RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK].
5. See, e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2004/26, Access to Medication in the
Context of Pandemics Such as HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 60th Sess., Mar.
15-Apr. 23, 2004, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/26 (Apr. 16, 2004), http://www.refworld
.org/docid/43f313650.html [https://perma.cc/CZ6M-NFG4]; Special Rapporteur on the
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical &
Mental Health, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment
of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, at 15-25, transmitted by
Note of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/63/263 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by Paul Hunt) (includ-
ing in the report's annex the Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in
Relation to Access to Medicines); HoLGFR HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGiiTS AND TIlE
WTO: TilE CASE OF PATENTS AN!) AcciSs TO MI)ICINES 229-55 (2007) (discussing
TRIPS flexibilities in relation to the protection of human rights).
6. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property "from Below": Copyright and Capa-
bility for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 803, 819 (2007) ("To the extent that develop-
ment is driven not only by economic growth but also by cultural and social change,
education is foundational."); Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limita-
tions, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries 2 (Int'l Ctr.
for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 15, 2006), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
iteipc200610_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RKX-FEGQ I ("[W]ith regard to education and ba-
sic scientific knowledge, limitations and exceptions are an important component in creating
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the protection of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expres-
sions,7 commentators have now turned their attention to other unex-
plored or underexplored areas. These areas include internet-related
human rights issues, 8 the right to science and culture,9 and the use of
human rights impact assessments in the intellectual property area.10
In March 2015, Farida Shaheed, the first and now-former U.N. Special
Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights (Special Rapporteur), released
her report on "Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture.""II
Focusing on "the interface of copyright policy with the protection of au-
thors' moral and material interests and the public's right to benefit from
scientific and cultural creativity," 12 this report emphasized the distinction
between copyright protection and protection of authorship. 13 It further
an environment in which domestic economic initiatives and development policies can take
root. A well-informed, educated and skilled citizenry is indispensable to the development
process.").
7. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of
Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, $ 65, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) [hereinafter High Commissioner's Report] (encouraging "the
adaptation of [intellectual property] systems so that they fully take into account cultural
and other rights of indigenous and local communities"); Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Ques-
tions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 740-44
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, Ten Common Questions] (discussing the protection of human rights
in relation to the interests of indigenous peoples and traditional communities).
8. For discussions of these issues, see generally Molly Beutz Land, Protecting Rights
Online, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2009); Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the
Internet, 54 HARV. INT-'L L.J. 393 (2013); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Enforcement Mea-
sures and Their Human Rights Threats, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 455.
9. For discussions of these rights, see generally HUMAN RIGI-HS IN EDUCATION, SCI-
ENCE AND CULTURE: LEGAL DI vELOPMENTS AND CIIALLENGES (Yvonne Donders &
Vladimir Volodin eds., 2007) [hereinafter HUMAN RiGHrs IN EDUCATION]; AURORA
PLOMER, PATENTS, HUMAN RIGrTS AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE 156-61 (2015); ELSA STA-
MATOPOULOU, CULTURAi RIGInS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ARTICLE 27 OF TIlE UNIVER-
SAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGiTS AND BEYOND (2007); UNESCO, THE Rioirr ro
ENJOY TilE BINEFrI'S OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2009); MARGARIE;T
WEIGERS VrI'ULLO & JESSICA WYNDIIAM, DEFINING THE RiGHT TIO ENJOY TIll BENEFITS
O1 SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND ITS APPLICATIONS: AMERICAN SCIENTISTS' PERSPECrIVES
(2013); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 121 (2010); Lea
Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and
Human Rights, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 637 (2009).
10. For discussions of these assessments, see generally JAMES HARRISON, TIE HUMAN
RIGHTrrS IMPACI OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 226-34 (2007); SIMON MARK
WALKER, TilE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENTS OF TRADE AGREE--
MENTS 123-86 (2009); Carlos M. Correa, Mitigating the Impact of Intellectual Property in
Developing Countries Through the Implementation of Human Rights, in RESEARCII HAND-
BOOK, supra note 4, at 201, 208-11; Lisa Forman & Gillian MacNaughton, Moving Theory
into Practice: Human Rights Impact Assessments of Intellectual Property Rights in Trade
Agreements, 7 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 109 (2015); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and
Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1096-98 (2012) [hereinaf-
ter Yu, Nonmultilateral Era].
11. Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Copyright Policy and the Right
to Science and Culture: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Sum-
mary, $ 4, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 2014) (by Farida
Shaheed) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy].
12. Id. T 6.
13. See id. 9 29 ("The human right to protection of authorship is ... not simply a
synonym for, or reference to, copyright protection, but a related concept against which
2016]
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called for the "expan[sion of] copyright exceptions and limitations to em-
power new creativity, enhance rewards to authors, increase educational
opportunities, preserve space for non-commercial culture and promote
inclusion and access to cultural works."1 4
Although the Special Rapporteur's views were easily understandable
from the perspectives of both access and development, her report stirred
up quite some controversy when it was presented to the Human Rights
Council.15 In the July 2015 meeting of the Standing Committee on Copy-
right and Related Rights of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), delegates from developing countries, to the dismay of their
counterparts from developed countries, also relied on her report to push
for greater discussions on limitations and exceptions. 16
In October 2015, the Special Rapporteur presented to the United Na-
tions General Assembly her report on patent policy. 17 If the reactions to
her previous copyright report are any guide, many will consider this new
report equally, if not more, controversial, given the developed countries'
longstanding support of the $300-billion global pharmaceutical industry.1 8
Appearing front and center in the patent report were the Special Rap-
porteur's views on how to strike an appropriate balance between the right
to "the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific ... production of which he [or she] is the author"'19 and other
copyright law should be judged. Protection of authorship as a human right requires in some
ways more and in other ways less than what is currently found in the copyright laws of
most countries."); see also Laurence R. Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAvis L. Riv. 971, 997 (2007) [hereinafter Heifer, Toward a
Human Rights Framework] ("A human rights framework for authors' rights is . . . both
more protective and less protective than the approach endorsed by copyright and neigh-
boring rights regimes."); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a
Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAvis L. Riv. 1039, 1131 (2007) [hereinafter Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests] ("[T]he recognition of the human rights
attributes of intellectual property rights may challenge the structure of the traditional intel-
lectual property system. In the copyright context, for example, such recognition will en-
courage the development of an author-centered regime, rather than one that is publisher-
centered.").
14. Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 4.
15. See Catherine Saez, UN Human Rights Council Debates Report Criticising Copy-
right, lrNr-1L. PROP. WArcl (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/031l/human-
rights-council-debates-report-criticising-copyright/ [https://perma.cc/0555-A9ZK] (report-
ing the disagreement over the U.N. Special Rapporteur's report).
16. See Catherine Saez, No Directions for WIPO Copyright Committee, Despite Posi-
tive Mood, INTFLL. PROP. WATCH (July 6, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/07/06/no-
directions-for-wipo-copyright-committee-despite-positive-mood/ [https://perma.cc/EX39-
NY8W] ("Several developing country delegations mentioned the report of Farida Shaheed,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur in the field of Cultural Rights.").
17. Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Cultural Rights, United Nations
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/70/279 (Aug. 4, 2015) (by Farida Shaheed) [hereinafter
Special Rapporteur's Report on Patent Policy].
18. See Pharmaceutical Industry, WORLD HEALTH OizG., http://www.who.int/trade/
glossary/story073/en/ [https:Hperma.cc/2XSP-4GBD] ("The global pharmaceuticals market
is worth US$300 billion a year, a figure expected to rise to US$400 billion within three
years.").
19. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27(2), G.A. Res. 217 (Ill) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(IlI) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("Everyone has the right to the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artis-
[Vol. 69
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human rights, such as the rights to food, health, education, science, cul-
ture, and self-determination.20 Specifically, the report identified the im-
pact of patent policy on both access to essential technologies and the
direction of scientific research. 21 It also outlined "the way forward" for
"[a]sserting the right to science and culture in patent policy" 22 -including
how to promote the right through exclusions, exceptions and flexibilities,
the importance of public participation and transparency, and examples of
good practices. 23
This report's focus on scientific productions is both important and
much-needed. It is important because the right to "enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress and its applications" 2 4 remains the only provision in
Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR) on which the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) has not yet drafted an interpretive comment.
This report will also provide a useful follow-up to the Special Rap-
porteur's earlier report on this particular right,25 which is largely under-
explored and has been referred to as a right that is "[t]ucked away at the
tic production of which he [or she] is the author."); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
January 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] ("The States Parties to the present Covenant rec-
ognize the right of everyone. . . [t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is
the author.").
20. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, 2 (criticizing the TRIPS Agreement for "not
adequately reflect[ing] the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all human rights, in-
cluding the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applica-
tions, the right to health, the right to food and the right to self-determination" as well as
the "apparent conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime embodied in the
TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on the other");
U.N. Econ. & Social Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General
Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and
Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which
He Is the Author (Art. 15(1)(c)), $ 39(e), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [herein-
after General Comment No. 17] (listing among those core obligations having immediate
effect the efforts "[t]o strike an adequate balance between the effective protection of the
moral and material interests of authors and States parties' obligations in relation to the
rights to food, health and education, as well as the rights to take part in cultural life and to
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any other right recognized
in the Covenant"); see also Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note
13, at 1125 ("[T]he right to the protection of interests in intellectual creations has been
heavily circumscribed by the right to cultural participation and development, the right to
the benefits of scientific progress, the right to food, the right to health, the right to educa-
tion, and the right to self-determination, as well as many other human rights.").
21. See Special Rapporteur's Report on Patent Policy, supra note 17, 11 46-60.
22. Id. pt. V.
23. See id. $% 63-86.
24. See UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(1) ("Everyone has the right freely to... share in
scientific advancement and its benefits"); ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 15(1)(b) (recogniz-
ing "the right of everyone ... [t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications").
25. Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits
of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/20/




tail end" of the UDHR.2 6 The focus on scientific productions in the Spe-
cial Rapporteur's patent report is also much-needed because the question
on the proper place of patent rights in the human rights framework re-
mains underexplored in literature on intellectual property and human
rights.
In view of the growing scholarship that has been devoted to the de-
bates on the human rights limits to intellectual property rights, intellec-
tual property and human rights, and intellectual property as human
rights, this article focuses on the complex interactions among scientific
productions, intellectual property, and human rights. It begins by examin-
ing how one form of intellectual property rights-namely, patent rights-
fit within the human rights framework for intellectual property, including
whether patent rights can be recognized as human rights. Although one
could question whether this framework should be established in the first
place, this article does not intend to revisit these questions, which other
commentators and I have already explored in great depth.2 7 Instead, it
takes the framework as its starting point. After examining the place of
patent rights in the human rights framework, this article systematically
dissects and holistically analyzes the entire framework to reveal its
anatomy.
Part I of this article outlines the various arguments for or against recog-
nizing patent rights as human rights. Although this discussion is similar to
the traditional discussion on intellectual property as human rights, it fo-
cuses specifically on patent rights. Such an analysis is important consider-
ing the limited literature on the interplay of patent rights and human
rights. It will provide insight into how patent rights interact with human
rights, including the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and
its applications. This Part further points out that neither the supporting
nor opposing arguments are entirely valid. After all, some aspects of pat-
ent rights are protected in international or regional human rights instru-
ments while the other aspects do not have any human rights basis. This
article therefore takes the view that one can locate human rights support
for only some but not all of patent rights.
Part II explores the proper place of intellectual property rights-in par-
ticular, patent rights-in the human rights framework for intellectual
property. In view of the framework's focus on the right to the protection
of the interests resulting from intellectual productions and its lack of dis-
tinction between copyrights and patents-legal concepts that are alien to
human rights law-this Part broadens the focus from patent rights to
cover all forms of intellectual property rights. This broader focus is
needed because scientific productions include "scientific publications and
26. William A. Schabas, Study of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific and Tech-
nological Progress and Its Application, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN En'UCATION, supra note 9, at
273, 273.
27. For discussions of the need to establish this framework, see generally Heifer, To-
ward a Human Rights Framework, supra note 13; Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Prop-
erty Interests, supra note 13.
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innovations, including knowledge, innovations and practices of indige-
nous and local communities. '28 Such a focus also makes great sense con-
sidering the reluctance on the part of indigenous communities to
distinguish between copyright and patent or between traditional cultural
expression and traditional knowledge.
To help facilitate a systematic and holistic study of the human rights
framework for intellectual property, Part 1I further advances a layered
approach to intellectual property and human rights. It begins by articulat-
ing seven organizing principles, all of which are drawn from the texts of
the UDHR and the ICESCR, the CESCR's interpretive comments, and
other intergovernmental documents discussing the interplay of intellec-
tual property and human rights. This Part then identifies four structural
layers in the human rights framework: (1) production; (2) interest; (3)
protection; and (4) limitation. It concludes by discussing the advantages
of organizing this framework into structural layers based on recognized
principles.
Part III illustrates the proposed layered framework with examples in-
volving four different types of scientific productions: (1) scientific publi-
cations; (2) scientific innovations (including inventions); (3) scientific
knowledge; and (4) indigenous knowledge, innovations, and practices.
Although this Part focuses on scientific productions-due in large part to
the CESCR's impending drafting of an interpretive comment on the right
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications-the pro-
posed layered approach and the structure identified in this article will
work equally well for other types of productions, including literary or ar-
tistic productions.
Part IV explores whether an alternative human rights basis can be
found in the right to own private property. This Part singles out this par-
ticular issue in light of the recurring debate among policymakers, com-
mentators, and intellectual property industries. It also takes into account
recent human rights developments in Europe, which may provide an al-
ternative human rights basis for intellectual property protection. Drawing
on the negotiating history of the ICESCR and recent developments con-
cerning the growing tension between intellectual property industries and
property rights advocates, this Part questions: (1) whether intellectual
property rights are always private property rights; and (2) whether the
right to own private property has already been recognized as a human
right. This Part aims to show that the right to own private property can-
not provide an alternative human rights basis for intellectual property
protection. Given the continuous use of the right to the protection of the
interests resulting from intellectual productions to provide human right
support for intellectual property rights, this Part concludes by underscor-
ing the need for a deeper understanding of the different organizing prin-
28. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 9.
2016]
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ciples and structural layers within the human rights framework for
intellectual property.
I. PATENT RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
In the past two decades, commentators have participated in the debate
on intellectual property and human rights (including the debate on the
human rights limits to intellectual property rights). 29 Beginning in the late
1990s, they have also begun engaging in the debate on intellectual prop-
erty as human rights.30 While this article does not seek to rehash argu-
ments advanced in either debate, it is worth recalling the frequent
criticisms concerning the inevitable distortions when disparate intellec-
tual property rights are lumped together and analyzed as if they are ho-
mogenous. 31 After all, arguments that work well for copyrights or
trademarks are not always valid for patents and trade secrets, and vice
versa.
Given the rapidly growing literature on these two debates, this Part
focuses specifically on whether patent rights are human rights. Such a
focus is important because most of the discussions in existing literature on
intellectual property and human rights tend to focus on either intellectual
creations derived from literary or artistic productions or the protection of
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions.32 Developing
a sophisticated understanding of the interplay of patents and human
rights will pave the way to the article's later discussion of scientific pro-
ductions as well as ways to resolve the tension or conflict between the
right to the protection of the interests resulting from intellectual produc-
29. See, e.g., Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1; Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res.
2001/21, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, 53d Sess., July 30-Aug. 17, 2001,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2001/21 (Aug. 16, 2001), http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/
SUBCOM/resolutions/E-CN_4-SUB_2-RES-2001-16.doc [https://perma.ce/9MEA-L7TC];
High Commissioner's Report, supra note 7.
30. See, e.g., General Comment No. 17, supra note 20; WoRiiDu INTELLECTIUAL PROP.
ORG., PUB. No. 762(E), INTELLECrIUAL PROPIERTY AND HUMAN Ricairrs (1998) [hereinaf-
ter WIPO PROCEEDINGS].
31. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005
MICH. Sr. L. REV. 1, 1 ("By bringing together different sets of rights that originated differ-
ently, protected different subject matter, and raised different policy questions, th[e] um-
brella term ['intellectual property'] encourages simplistic thinking that ignores the different
characteristics and limitations of copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and other
neighboring rights."); Richard M. Stallman, Some Confusing or Loaded Words and Phrases
That Are Worth Avoiding, FREF SOFTWARE FOUND., http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/
words-to-avoid.html [https://perma.cc/5T3M-HUAD] ("Publishers and lawyers like to de-
scribe copyright as 'intellectual property'-a term also applied to patents, trademarks, and
other more obscure areas of law. These laws have so little in common, and differ so much,
that it is ill-advised to generalize about them. It is best to talk specifically about 'copyright,'
or about 'patents,' or about 'trademarks."').
32. Some of the rare literature discussing the interplay of patents and human rights
includes Jan Brinkhof, On Patents and Human Rights, in A PARADOX, supra note 4, at 140;
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where Is the Paradox?, in A PARA-
DOX, supra note 4, at 73 [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights]; Wendy J.
Gordon, Current Patent Laws Cannot Claim the Backing of Human Rights, in A PARADOX,
supra note 4, at 155.
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tions and the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its
applications.
This Part begins by analyzing in turn the different arguments for and
against recognizing patent rights as human rights-that is, rights that "de-
rive[ ] from the inherent dignity and worth of all persons. ' 33 It then ex-
plains why neither position can be easily supported. Instead, some aspects
of patent rights are protected in international or regional human rights
instruments, while the other aspects do not have any human rights ba-
sis.34 As a result of these complications, this Part calls for a greater dis-
tinction between the human rights and non-human rights aspects of
patent rights.
A. FOR
In academic literature, those arguing for the recognition of patent
rights as human rights tend to begin with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and the ICESCR, relying on their textual lan-
guage, negotiating histories, interpretive comments, and supporting inter-
governmental documents. Specifically, they have advanced four
arguments.
The first argument concerns the texts of the UDHR and the ICESCR,
both of which explicitly recognize the right to "the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artis-
tic production of which he [or she] is the author. ' 35 Although the texts
mention the "author" but not the "inventor," 36 they use the phrase "sci-
entific, literary or artistic production." This phrase stands in sharp con-
trast to the phrase "literary, artistic or scientific work," which the United
33. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 1.
34. See Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 26 ("Some
elements of intellectual property protection are indeed required-or at least strongly en-
couraged-by reference to the right to science and culture. Other elements of contempo-
rary intellectual property laws go beyond what the right to protection of authorship
requires, and may even be incompatible with the right to science and culture."); see also
Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1077 ("[S]ome at-
tributes of intellectual property rights are protected in international or regional human
rights instruments, while other attributes do not have any human rights basis at all."); Yu,
Ten Common Questions, supra note 7, at 710-11 ("[Slome attributes of intellectual prop-
erty rights are protected in international or regional human rights instruments while other
attributes do not have any human rights basis at all.").
35. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 15(1)(c).
36. Article 13 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man does
mention the word "inventions" in addition to "literary, scientific or artistic works." See
Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
art. 13, May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser. L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American
Declaration] ("[E]very person.., has the right to the protection of his moral and material
interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he [or
she] is the author."). But cf Special Rapporteur's Report on Patent Policy, supra note 17,
28 ("A strongly debated question is whether 'authors' in article 15, paragraph 1(c) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights includes inventors and
scientific discoverers, and whether the latter, like 'authors', enjoy the right to the protec-




Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
proposed in the early drafting process. 37 By using the phrase "scientific
production," the instruments therefore offer broader protection than the
mere protection of scientific works or scientific publications.
The second argument focuses on the deep concern regarding scientific
research and its abuse among the drafters of both the UDHR and the
ICESCR. During the drafting of the UDHR, the delegates were widely
concerned about the abuse of science and technology during the Second
World War and the wide use of conscripted scientists and engineers in
Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.38 They therefore called for stronger
protection of intellectual labor in the human rights regime. For example,
Mexican delegate Pablo Campos Ortiz identified the right to the protec-
tion of the interests resulting from intellectual productions as a right of
the individual as "an intellectual worker, artist, scientist or writer."'3 9
Likewise, after discussing the article on the freedom of thought, Peruvian
delegate Jos6 Encinas stated that "it seemed pertinent now to recognize
freedom of creative thought, in order to protect it from harmful pressures
which were only too frequent in recent history. '40
Similar statements could be found in the drafting history of the
ICESCR. The Swedish delegation stated that "the protection of those
rights [in Article 15] would be an encouragement to science and creative
activity. ' 41 The Israeli delegation maintained that "[i]t would be impossi-
ble to give effective encouragement to the development of culture unless
the rights of authors and scientists were protected. '4 2 Even today, the
CESCR had described the obligations in Articles 15(1)(c) and 15(3) as "a
material safeguard for the freedom of scientific research and creative
activity." 43
The third argument relates to the fact that patent protection was specif-
ically discussed during the drafting of the ICESCR. As Maria Green
recounted:
37. See CESCR, Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights: Drafting History of the Article 15(l)(c) of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/15 (Oct. 9, 2000)
(by Maria Green) [hereinafter Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c)].
38. See Audrey Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scien-
tific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, in WIPO PROCEDINGS, supra note 30,
at 127, 131 ("Like other provisions of the UDHR, the context for drafting Article 27 was
the widespread reaction to the Nazi genocide and the brutality of World War II. Science
and technology had played an important role in the war and served as an instrument of the
Holocaust."); Richard Pierre Claude, Scientists' Rights and the Human Right to the Benefits
of Science, in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAl., AND
CUL-TURAl. RIGIrs 247, 249-50 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell eds., 2002) [hereinafter
CORE OIBLIGATIONS] (discussing the abuse of science and scientists for purposes of power
aggrandizement).
39. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECILARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORI-
GINS, DRAFTING, AND INTF NT 221 (1999).
40. Id. at 218.
41. Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c), supra note 37, 38.
42. Id.
43. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, $1 4.
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[Chilean delegate Carlos Valenzuela] fully sympathized with the
praiseworthy intentions of the French delegation and agreed that in-
tellectual production should be protected; but there was also need to
protect the under-developed countries, which had greatly suffered in
the past from their inability to compete in scientific research and to
take out their own patents. As a result, they were in thrall to the
technical knowledge held exclusively by a few monopolies. As the
French amendment would perpetuate that situation, he would have
to vote against it. In general, the subject was so complex that it
would have to be dealt with in a separate convention than in a single
article of the covenant on human rights.44
Responding to Valenzuela's concern as well as to those of others,
French delegate Pierre Juvigny stated that "[h]e did not agree with the
Chilean representative that monopoly in the field of patents represented
such a grave danger; moreover, the absence of protection was not a rem-
edy for the unfavourable situation in under-developed countries. ' ' 45 His
British colleague, Sir Samuel Hoare, expanded on this point at greater
length:
The Chilean representative had raised an interesting point: the con-
flict between the conception that the rights of the creative worker
must be protected and the principle that there should be no obstruc-
tion to the general utilization of the results of his work in the inter-
ests of humanity. In the light of these remarks, sub-paragraph (b) of
the original article 30 deserved further examination. He had always
understood it to mean that the benefits of scientific progress were to
be made available to all within the limits and by use of the machinery
which already existed. If the Chilean representative believed that the
clause was intended to do away with all the intermediaries between
the inventor and the general application of his invention, he was pro-
posing to reform the world by one brief article. Such a conception
went far beyond the scope of the covenant, and the United Kingdom
delegation could not subscribe to it.4 6
Notably, all of these delegates distinguished patents from copyrights
based on their impact, rather than their human rights bases or the lack
thereof. Even the Chilean delegate seemed to have agreed that the pre-
sent language would cover both copyrights and patents.
The final argument pertains to the considerable recognition individual
inventors have achieved, especially before the Second World War. As
children have been taught in elementary schools-whether entirely cor-
rect or not 47-Samuel Morse invented the telegraph, Alexander Graham
44. Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c), supra note 37, 29.
45. Id. $ 31.
46. Id.
47. As Mark Lemley declared:
The canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely a myth. Edison
didn't invent the lightbulb; he found a bamboo fiber that worked better as a
filament in the lightbulb developed by Sawyer and Man, who in turn built on
lighting work done by others. Bell filed for his telephone patent on the very
same day as an independent inventor, Elisha Gray; the case ultimately went
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Bell the telephone, Thomas Edison the gramophone and the light bulb,
Guglielmo Marconi the radio, and the Wright Brothers the airplane. 48
The more we focus on individual inventors and the human dimension of
their inventions, the more we are ready to recognize their human rights.49
B. AGAINST
In academic literature, those arguing against the recognition of patent
rights as human rights often begin with the need to separate copyrights
from patents.50 In her book chapter arguing against recognizing patent
rights as human rights, for instance, Rochelle Dreyfuss noted the distinc-
tion between copyrights and patents:
There may well be important differences between the intellectual en-
deavors protected by copyrights and the material protected by pat-
ents. It is far easier to see a human rights dimension in the case of
the former. After all, expression and personality are intimately inter-
twined. Because one can learn a great deal about a person from what
he has said and how he has said it, protecting expression safeguards
human dignity. But it is hard to make that case for a product or pro-
cess, where value resides in functionality and not in the identity of
the inventor. There is nothing about a product or a process (or for
that matter, a newly discovered principle of nature) that trenches
upon the personality of the inventor. For example, we know a great
deal about Thomas Edison. But we know it from reading his papers,
not from turning on his light bulb. Accordingly, while a case can be
made for giving Edison control over his output as an author, it is
hard to argue that he deserves that protection as an inventor.5 1
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which filled an entire volume of the United States
Reports resolving the question of whether Bell could have a patent despite
the fact that he hadn't actually gotten the invention to work at the time he
filed. The Wright Brothers were the first to fly at Kitty Hawk as a result of an
improvement they made to a basic wing structure designed by others, but
their plane didn't work very well. It was quickly surpassed by aircraft built by
Glenn Curtiss and others-planes that the Wrights delayed by over a decade
with patent lawsuits. And on and on.
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MIcH. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (2012)
[hereinafter Lemley, Myth of the Sole Inventor]; see also Susan Scafidi, Digital Property /
Analog History, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 245, 251-58 (2004) (discussing whether Guglielmo
Marconi should be heralded as the "Father of Radio").
48. For interesting discussions of disputes among major inventors, see generally HAI,
HELLMAN, GREAT FEUDS IN TECHNOLOGY: TEN OF THE LIVELIEST DisPums EVER
(2004).
49. Cf Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 344
(1988) ("With inventions, the object may precede the personality stake, but with time the
scientist or engineer comes to identify himself with his scientific or technological
advances.").
50. See Yu, Ten Common Questions, supra note 7, at 721-26 (discussing the question
concerning whether patents should be separated from copyrights in the human rights
debate).
51. Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 80-81 (footnotes omitted);
see also Brinkhof, supra note 32, at 149 ("Article 15(1)(c) mentions neither patents nor
inventions. Scientific production is not synonymous with patents. And the provision is ex-
tremely vague as to the intended end-result."); Daniel Gervais, Human Rights and the
Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note
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Professor Dreyfuss's careful observation was well supported by the de-
sign of the existing patent system, which has made it problematic to rec-
ognize patent rights as human rights in five ways. First, the system does
not always protect the first inventor's human rights. Those inventors who
have chosen to commercialize the patented invention or disclose it in a
publication without first filing for a patent within the designated period
will not be able to obtain protection despite the inalienable nature of the
inventors' human rights.52 In a first-to-file jurisdiction-as opposed to a
first-inventor-to-file jurisdiction, such as the United States following its
adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act-questions can also
be raised over whether the patentee is actually the inventor and, there-
fore, whether the patent system adequately protects the inventor's human
rights.53
Second, even when the system protects the first inventor's human
rights, it does not recognize the similar rights of subsequent inventors. As
the late Robert Nozick rightly pointed out: "An inventor's patent does
not deprive others of an object which would not exist if not for the inven-
tor. Yet patents would have this effect on others who independently in-
vent the object."'54 Similar to Nozick, Lawrence Becker found the
emphasis on the first inventor highly problematic:
Being the first (the oldest known) instance of a given intellectual
product is sometimes given unjustified weight. Either later instances
were derived from older ones or not. If they were, then credit for
originality belongs only with the oldest. If later instances were inde-
pendent, however, then credit for originality goes to them as well.
Temporal primacy should not be confused with originality.55
Thus far, many commentators have argued against the extension of
human rights to patents based on the lack of an "independent invention"
doctrine 56-the patent law equivalent of the copyright law doctrine of
4, at 89, 95 [hereinafter Gervais, Human Rights] ("Human rights claims to a patented in-
vention are harder to anchor in personhood theories."); Hughes, supra note 49, at 341-42
("We tend not to think of [patents, microchip masks, and engineering trade secrets] as
manifesting the personality of an individual, but rather as manifesting a raw, almost ge-
neric insight. In inventing the light bulb, Edison searched for the filament material that
would burn the longest, not a filament that would reflect his personality. Marconi chose to
use a particular wavelength for his radio because that wavelength could travel much far-
ther than waves slightly longer, not because that wavelength was his preferred form of
expression.").
52. See Gordon, supra note 32, at 165 ("[A] person who authors an invention, but who
practices it publicly, or discloses it in a publication, after a year cannot claim patent protec-
tion in it. This may make sense from a utilitarian perspective, but the result is that an'author' lacks rights." (footnotes omitted)).
53. See id. at 164 ("When nations make 'first to file' the test for inventorship it is
possible that many persons who are the first to conceive of an invention, or even the first to
reduce it to practice, will be denied patents.").
54. ROmBRT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 182 (1974).
55. Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CIn.-KENT L.
REV. 609, 618 (1993).
56. See Gordon, supra note 32, at 166-67 (discussing in the human rights context the
problems raised by the failure of patent rights to benefit all independent inventors); see
also Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105
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"independent creation. ' 57 When one takes into account the doctrine of
equivalents-which broadens the prohibition to cover subsequent inven-
tors whose inventions have been deemed legally "equivalent"-the prob-
lem with the existing patent system becomes even more obvious.58 In
view of these many problems, some commentators have called for the
introduction of prior user rights or defenses, which allow third parties to
continue to use or commercialize the patented inventions based on their
usage before the filing of relevant applications. 59
Third, although individual inventors enjoy the right to have their names
attached to a patent, 60 they do not have a legal right to protect the integ-
rity of their inventions.61 Having the ability to protect against distortion is
important, because human rights protect not only the material interests
resulting from intellectual productions but also the moral interests result-
ing from those productions. Indeed, the lack of protection for the integ-
rity of an invention stands in sharp contrast to the ability to protect the
integrity of a copyrighted work. In jurisdictions offering strong moral
rights protection, the right of integrity (le droit au respect de l'euvre) pre-
Mici. L. REV. 475 (2006) (arguing for the introduction of an independent invention de-
fense in patent law); Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copy-
ing, 105 Mrcii. L. REV. 1525 (2007) (expressing concern about Professor Vermont's
proposal and offering alternative suggestions).
57. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)
(Holmes, J.) ("Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy.");
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.) ("[Ilf by
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that
poem, though they might of course copy Keats's.").
58. For discussions of the doctrine of equivalents, see generally Michael D. Pendleton,
When the Same Patent Means Different Things in Different Jurisdictions: A Comparative
Analysis of Patent Interpretation, in 2 INTE-11IcIUAIL PROPiEiRTY AN!) INFOIR.MATION
WEALTH.: ISSUES AND PRACIIC17S IN THE DIGITAl. AGE 83 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) [herein-
after INTILLECIUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMA-1ION WI-ALII'1-]; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent
Protection Under the Modern Doctrine of Equivalents and Implied Disclaimer Doctrines, in
2 INTFIi.uCTrUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH, supra, at 55.
59. In the United States, the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act recently expanded
the prior user defense beyond business method patents to cover all types of technologies.
See 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012) (providing a defense to infringement based on prior commercial
use). The need for prior user rights is also frequently mentioned in the traditional knowl-
edge debate. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the
Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 Micii. J.
INT'L L. 919, 957 (1996) (suggesting as right recipients those communities that "have long
used the process or product at issue"); Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving
Jurisprudential Diversity in the International Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in INTER-
NATIONAL PUBLIc GOO S AN!) TRANSFER OF TECiHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOI3AIZIu) IN-
TEL!LECTAL PROeI-Yrry REGIME_ 521, 545 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds.,
2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLic GooDs] (providing for an exception "for the
continuation of bona fide prior use").
60. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4ter, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967) [hereinafter
Paris Convention] (stipulating that "the inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as
such in the patent"); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title.").
61. See Hughes, supra note 49, at 351.
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vents others from distorting, mutilating, or modifying the work in a man-
ner that would prejudice the authors' honor or reputation. 62
Fourth, the increased corporatization of industrial research and devel-
opment63 and the simultaneous lack of focus on "heroic inventors" may
have colored the perception that patent protection lacks any human
rights basis.64 In regard to copyright law, commentators have extensively
discussed and critiqued the construction of the romantic author.65 An
equivalent notion of the "lone inventor" 66 or "lone genius," 67 however,
does not have the same recognition in patent law except perhaps within
the patent bar or in the legislative arena. Indeed, very few contemporary
academic commentators have argued for a strong natural rights justifica-
tion for patents. 68
Finally, as Professor Dreyfuss cautioned us, elevating patent rights to
human rights could undermine the patent system by significantly reducing
the incentives it generates. 69 As she observed:
62. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
6bis(l), Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971)
[hereinafter Berne Convention] (protecting "the right. . . to object to any distortion, muti-
lation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation").
63. As Professor Dreyfuss observed:
[T]he institutions of science are evolving. Universities are now active partici-
pants in the patent system, and that development creates demand for a re-
gime that protects the work that universities do-which is to say, patents on
upstream research. Furthermore, research is increasingly conducted in small,
highly networked knowledge-intensive firms. These firms put new pressure
on the patent system because they use patent rights in novel ways: to facili-
tate cooperation and as signals of technical and business competence.
Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 85 (footnote omitted).
64. For discussions of the "heroic inventor" in patent law, see generally Mark D. Janis,
Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TE!c I. L.J. 899, 908-22 (2002); Lemley, Myth of the Sole
Inventor, supra note 47.
65. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AuTHiORS AND OWNIRS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGIrI
(1993); TI-E CONSTRUC'ION OF AuTiOiRstiu: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AN!)
LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); Carla Hesse, Enlightenment
Epistemology and the Laws of Authorship in Revolutionary France, 1777-1793, 30 RE, PRE-
SENTATIONS 109 (1990); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphosis of
"Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright:
Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author," 17 EIGIrrEPNTI-IN-
TURY STun. 425 (1984).
66. Janis, supra note 64, at 911.
67. Lemley, Myth of the Sole Inventor, supra note 47, at 710.
68. A rare exception is my former colleague, Adam Mossoff. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff,
Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTrINGS
L.J. 1255 (2001); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Pat-
ents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953
(2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Thomas Jefferson]. Although few recent commentators have
conceptualized patent rights as natural rights, such a conception was common in pre-war
patent literature. Writing in the late nineteenth century, for example, William Robinson,
the author of the leading patent law treatise of his time, wrote: "It is a law of nature that
men should profit by the discoveries and inventions of each other. This is the law which
binds society together, and in obedience to which lies all the possibility of moral, intellec-
tual, and material advancement." WILH1AM ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL IN-
VENTIONS 39 (1890).
69. See Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 74.
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Elevating intellectual property rights to human rights has unfortu-
nate pragmatic consequences. Presumably, human rights can be out-
weighed only by other human rights. Accordingly, under a human
rights approach, the benefit stream flowing from inventive produc-
tion can be distributed, without a patentee's authorization, only to
meet social needs that are likewise classified as fundamental. (Or to
put it another way, every incursion on a patent right would need to
be justified by showing that it involved an interest that is not only
socially desirable, but that can also be categorized as a human right.)
Instead of relying on legislatures and courts to wield well-understood
tools embedded in existing patent law, ad hoc rights-balancing leads
to unpredictable decision-making. The result, ironically, is an envi-
ronment less conducive to decisions to invest time and money in in-
tellectual efforts. The new-human rights-justification can, in short,
thwart the traditional-utilitarian-goal of limiting protection from
free riders as a means of encouraging the advancement of
knowledge. 70
C. SUMMARY
As shown above, those arguing for recognizing patent rights as human
rights have strong textual and historical support from the UDHR and the
ICESCR. By contrast, those arguing against such recognition also have
strong textual support from existing patent law and strong empirical sup-
port from the existing patent system. In a battle between the two camps,
neither side will have a decisive victory.
To a large extent, this stalemate can be attributed to the fact that some
aspects of patent rights are protected in international or regional human
rights instruments while the other aspects do not have any human rights
basis. Thus, the arguments for or against recognizing patent rights as
human rights are only valid with respect to some but not all aspects of
patent rights.
Thus, if we are to develop a robust and sophisticated human rights
framework for intellectual property that accurately reflects the limited
human rights status of patent rights, we will need to be able to distinguish
70. Id. Similarly, Professors Heifer and Austin observed:
Intellectual property commentators, especially those working in the Anglo-
American tradition, employ the analytical tools of utilitarianism and welfare
economics to evaluate the trade-offs between incentives and access and the
consequences for the individuals and firms that create, own, and consume
intellectual property products. The international human rights movement, by
contrast, engages in a discourse of absolutes that seeks to delineate the nega-
tive and positive duties of states to respect and promote inalienable individ-
ual freedoms. As a result, to label something as a "human right" often
invokes-in rhetoric if not always in reality-a language of trumps and un-
conditional demands. This emphasis on categorical rights and responsibilities
appears ill suited to the rapidly changing technological and economic envi-
ronment in which intellectual property rules operate, an environment that
often engenders calls for incremental recalibrations of the balance between
incentives and access.
HELFF.R & AUSTIN, supra note 2, at 504.
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between the human rights and non-human rights aspects of patent rights.
Such a distinction is needed not only in regard to patent rights and the
human rights interests resulting from scientific productions, but also
other intellectual property rights as well as the human rights interests re-
sulting from other forms of productions, such as literary or artistic
productions.
II. A LAYERED APPROACH
In light of the complexities concerning the limited human rights status
of patent rights and the need for a better understanding of the place of
these rights in the human rights framework for intellectual property, this
Part proposes a layered approach to intellectual property and human
rights. It further dissects the framework, breaking it down into seven or-
ganizing principles and four structural layers. Although the previous Part
focused on only patent rights, this Part broadens the coverage to explore
all forms of intellectual property rights. This broader focus is needed be-
cause scientific productions can include scientific publications, scientific
innovations (including inventions), scientific knowledge, as well as indige-
nous knowledge, innovations, and practices. Moreover, the human rights
framework focuses on the right to the protection of the interests resulting
from intellectual productions and does not distinguish between copyright
and patent rights. The latter are concepts in the intellectual property re-
gime, not the human rights regime.
In the past decade, the U.N. Sub-Commission's Resolution 2000/7 on
"Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights" 71 and the CESCR's in-
terpretive comments on Articles 15(1)(a) and 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR 72
have provided considerable guidance on the development of a human
rights framework for intellectual property. Nevertheless, commentators
have yet to conduct a systematic and holistic study of this framework.
This Part therefore seeks to fill the lacuna. Part II.A articulates seven
principles that would help organize the human rights framework for intel-
lectual property. Part II.B identifies four structural layers in the frame-
work that warrant distinct treatment and analysis. Part II.C concludes
with a brief discussion of the resemblance between the proposed layered
approach and other layered approaches advanced by scholars in the intel-
lectual property and related fields. It further outlines four advantages of
using the proposed layered approach to intellectual property and human
rights.
A. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES
To help organize the human rights framework for intellectual property,
this section develops seven principles based on the texts of the UDHR
71. Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1.
72. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20; CESCR, General Comment No. 21: Right
of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life (Art. 15, Para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 37, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/2I (Dec. 21, 2009).
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and the ICESCR, the CESCR's interpretive comments, and other inter-
governmental documents discussing the interplay of intellectual property
and human rights: (1) incongruity principle; (2) non-interchangeability
principle; (3) essentiality principle; (4) diversity principle; (5) flexibility
principle; (6) multiplicity principle; and (7) substitutability principle.
These seven principles are important because they help us better un-
derstand how to promote the flexibilities within the intellectual property
system as well as to maintain adequate protection of the human rights
interests resulting from intellectual productions. As the Special Rap-
porteur reminded us in her recent report on patent policy, "Whereas
from the perspective of trade law, exclusions, exceptions and flexibilities
under international intellectual property law, such as the World Trade
Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights, remain optional, from the perspective of human rights, they
are often to be considered as obligations. '73
1. Incongruity Principle
The first principle is that the human rights framework for intellectual
property protects only some aspects of some intellectual property rights.
This framework, however, does not protect all intellectual property rights
or all aspects of these rights.
Commentators generally separate the discussion of intellectual prop-
erty and human rights based on whether they subscribe to the conflict
approach or the coexistence approach.7 4 While the former views the two
sets of rights as being in fundamental conflict, the latter considers them
essentially compatible. Although these commentators once debated
which approach was preferable, most of them, especially those subscrib-
ing to a positivist conception of human rights, 75 have now recognized that
some aspects of intellectual property rights are recognized as human
rights while the other aspects do not have any human rights basis.
73. Special Rapporteur's Report on Patent Policy, supra note 17, summary.
74. For discussions of these two approaches, see generally Paul L.C. Torremans, Copy-
right (and Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right, in INTELLFCrUAL PROP-
ERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 221, 222-23; Laurence R. Heifer, Human
Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTlFLL. PROP. Riv. 47,
48-49 (2003); Yu, Ten Common Questions, supra note 7, at 709-11.
75. Professor Richard Falk noted the existence of two jurisprudential schools:
The positivists consider the content of human rights to be determined by the
texts agreed upon by states and embodied in valid treaties, or determined by
obligatory state practice attaining the status of binding international custom.
The naturalists, on the other hand, regard the content of human rights as
principally based upon immutable values that endow standards and norms
with a universal validity.
Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PFRS'ECwrIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSus 44, 44
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992); see also THOMAS W. POGGE, WORILD POVERTY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLIrAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 59 (2d ed. 2008)
(discussing the distinction between legal and moral human rights).
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In her recent report on copyright policy, for example, the Special Rap-
porteur declared:
Some elements of intellectual property protection are indeed re-
quired-or at least strongly encouraged-by reference to the right to
science and culture. Other elements of contemporary intellectual
property laws go beyond what the right to protection of authorship
requires, and may even be incompatible with the right to science and
culture.76
Audrey Chapman also noted the lack of a "basis in human rights to justify
using intellectual property instruments as a means to protect economic
investments, '77 even though she found that the drafting history of the
UDHR supported "relatively weak claims of intellectual property as a
human right."'78
In previous works, I questioned the human rights basis of "corporate
trademarks and trade secrets, works made for hire, employee inventions,
neighboring rights for broadcasters and phonogram producers, database
protection, protection for clinical trial data, and other rights that prima-
rily protect the economic investments of institutional authors and inven-
tors."' 79 Yet, I recognize the human rights basis of some aspects of
copyrights and patent rights.80 Thus, if the human rights framework is to
be systematically organized, it is important that the human rights aspects
of intellectual property rights be distinguished from the non-human
rights aspects of these rights.
2. Non-interchangeability Principle
The second principle is that the human rights framework for intellec-
tual property protects both the moral and material interests resulting
from intellectual productions-interests that are not interchangeable.
76. Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 26.
77. Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related to ICESCR Article 15(1)(c), in
CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 38, at 305, 316-17 [hereinafter Chapman, Core
Obligations].
78. Id. at 314.
79. Yu, Nonmultilateral Era, supra note 10, at 1061-62; accord Yu, Ten Common
Questions, supra note 7, at 727-28 (raising similar questions); see also Drafting History of
the Article 15(1)(c), supra note 37, $ 45 ("[T]he drafters [of the ICESCR] do not seem to
have been thinking in terms of the corporation-held patent, or the situation where the
creator is simply an employee of the entity that holds the patent or the copyright.");
Brinkhof, supra note 32, at 140 ("[T]he human rights aspects of trademark law are less
obvious since this is a branch of [intellectual property] law concerned not so much with the
intellectual achievements of individuals, but rather with the regulation of competition
through the prevention of confusion arising between participants in a market."); Chapman,
Core Obligations, supra note 77, at 316-17 (noting that there is no "basis in human rights
to justify using intellectual property instruments as a means to protect economic
investments").
80. See Yu, Nonmultilateral Era, supra note 10, at 1071 ("While not all forms of intel-
lectual property rights should be protected at the level of human rights, copyrights and
patents clearly implicate the material interests of individual authors and inventors."); see
also Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1083-92 (dis-




The UDHR, the ICESCR, and other international or regional human
rights instruments-such as the American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man 81-have all protected both the moral and material inter-
ests resulting from intellectual productions. While the protection of the
moral interests "safeguards the personal link between authors and their
creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their
collective cultural heritage," the protection of the material interests "en-
able authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living."'82
The emphasis on the protection of both interests is important because
these protections are not always interchangeable. Just because the law
protects the material interests resulting from intellectual productions
does not mean that this particular law also protects the moral interests
resulting from these productions. Indeed, the high level of economic pro-
tection in countries that prioritize economic rights over personality rights
does not always enable these countries to discharge those human rights
obligations that are related to the protection of the moral interests result-
ing from intellectual productions.
A case in point is the United States. Although the country already of-
fers moral rights protection to works of visual art83-such as paintings,
sculptures, and print photographs-such protection remains limited, es-
pecially when compared with the protections offered in continental Eu-
rope. 84 More problematic, because the protection is confined to works of
visual art, such protection does not extend to scientific publications. 85
Thus, the United States arguably does not offer adequate protection to
the moral interests resulting from scientific productions even though its
copyright and patent systems already protect the material interests from
these productions at a very high level. 86
81. See American Declaration, supra note 36, art. 13 ("[E]very person ... has the right
to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any liter-
ary, scientific or artistic works of which he [or she] is the author.").
82. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, $ 2; cf. ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 11(1)
(recognizing "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement
of living conditions").
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
84. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories:" Narrative's Implications for Moral
Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAl. L. Riv. 1, 22-43 (2001)
(showing the limited protection of moral rights in the United States despite the enactment
of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990); Peter K. Yu, Moral Rights 2.0, 1 TLX. A&M L.RLV. 873, 874-77 (2014) (discussing the differences between the United States and conti-
nental Europe over the protection of moral rights).
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("A work of visual art does not include ... any...
technical drawing, diagram, model, . . . book .... periodical, data base, electronic informa-
tion service, electronic publication, or similar publication .
86. Similarly, Professor Heifer observed:
A human rights framework for authors' rights is . . . both more protective
and less protective than the approach endorsed by copyright and neighboring
rights regimes. It is more protective in that rights within the core zone of
autonomy [as protected by human rights instruments] are subject to a far
more stringent limitations test than the one applicable contained in intellec-
tual property treaties and national laws. It is also less protective, however, in
that a state need not recognize any authors' rights lying outside of this zone
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3. Essentiality Principle
The third principle is that the human rights framework for intellectual
property requires only minimum essential levels of protection. Under this
principle, state parties retain a wide margin of discretion in determining
the appropriate additional levels of protection based on available re-
sources and local conditions.
Although the UDHR, the ICESCR, and other international and re-
gional human rights instruments recognize the protection of human rights
interests resulting from intellectual productions, they do not demand very
high levels of protection. Instead, they merely require the provision of"minimum essential levels" of protection, 87 which commentators have
further defined as "the essential element or elements without which [a
right] loses its substantive significance as a human right." 88
Once state parties have satisfied their minimum core obligations, 89 the
ICESCR requires them to take "deliberate, concrete and targeted" steps
toward the full realization of the stipulated rights. 90 Although General
Comment No. 3 does not explain how the competing demands of these
obligations are to be balanced or whether some of these rights are to be
protected to a greater extent or with more deliberate speed, the ICESCR
stipulates that state parties, without a compelling justification, cannot
take retrogressive measures that will lower the existing protection.91
or, if it does recognize such additional rights, it must give appropriate weight
to other social, economic, and cultural rights and to the public's interest in
access to knowledge.
Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Framework, supra note 13, at 997.
87. See CESCR, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations
(Art. 2, Par. 1), 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 3] ("[T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent
upon every State party."); CESCR, The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 (Nov. 27, 2000) (noting the state par-
ties' minimum core obligations).
88. Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction to CORE OBLIGATIONS, supra
note 38, at 1, 9.
89. See Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Framework, supra note 13, at 996 (noting "the
existence of an irreducible core of rights-a zone of personal autonomy in which authors
can achieve their creative potential, control their productive output, and lead independent,
intellectual lives, all of which are essential requisites for any free society"); Yu, Reconcep-
tualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1105-13 (discussing the core mini-
mum approach).
90. General Comment No. 3, supra note 87, 2; see also ICESCR, supra note 19, art.
2(1) (requiring each state party "to take steps ... to the maximum of its available re-
sources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of
legislative measures"); see also MArTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, Tu- INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTrURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON 1Is DEVEILOPMENI
136-44 (1995) (discussing the phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" in the
ICESCR); Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1113-23
(discussing the progressive realization approach).
91. See ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 5(1) ("Any State, group or person ... [may not]
engage in any activity or ... perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in the present Covenant.").
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As far as the protection of the material interests resulting from intellec-
tual productions is concerned, the ICESCR only requires a level of pro-
tection that will "enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of
living."'92 Once state parties have reached this minimum threshold, they
will enjoy a wide margin of discretion in determining whether additional
protection should be granted. As General Comment No. 17 declares, Arti-
cle 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR "by no means prevents States parties from
adopting higher protection standards in international treaties on the pro-
tection of the moral and material interests of authors or in their domestic
laws, provided that these standards do not unjustifiably limit the enjoyment
by others of their rights under the Covenant. 93
Oftentimes, state parties will have to make decisions based on available
resources and local conditions. 9 4 For instance, Article 22 of the UDHR
specifically states that "the economic, social and cultural rights indispen-
sable for [one's] dignity and the free development of his [or her] person-
ality" are to be realized "in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State."'95 Likewise, General Comment No. 17 states that
the precise application of the essential and interrelated elements in the
right to the protection of the interests resulting from intellectual produc-
tions "will depend on the economic, social and cultural conditions pre-
vailing in a particular State party. '96
This arrangement resonates well with those advocating greater flexibili-
ties within the international intellectual property system as well as those
supporting the various development agendas at the World Trade Organi-
zation, WIPO and other international fora.97 The low threshold of protec-
tion in the human rights regime also explains why the CESCR has
repeatedly cautioned us not to equate the protection required by the
92. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 2; see also CRAVI-N, supra note 90, at
287-351 (discussing the "right to an adequate standard of living").
93. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 11 (footnote omitted and emphasis
added).
94. See id. $ 47 ("The most appropriate measures to implement the right to the protec-
tion of the moral and material interests of the author will vary significantly from one State
to another. Every State has a considerable margin of discretion in assessing which mea-
sures are most suitable to meet its specific needs and circumstances."); see also Laurence
R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for a
European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'i L.J. 357, 404-05 (1998) (discussing the
margin of appreciation doctrine embraced by the European Court of Human Rights); Hel-
fer, Toward a Human Rights Framework, supra note 13, at 998 ("Governments retain-at
least in the near term-a fairly broad 'margin of appreciation' within which to reconcile
human rights guarantees, intellectual property protection rules, and other policy
objectives .... ).
95. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 22; see also ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 2(1) ("Each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maxi-
mum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particu-
larly the adoption of legislative measures.").
96. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, $ 18.
97. See Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 Oirno N.U. L. REv. 465,
522-40 (2009) (discussing these different development agendas).
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human rights system with those required by the intellectual property sys-
tem.98 As the CESCR declared:
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitle-
ments belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances,
groups of individuals and communities. Human rights are fundamen-
tal as they are inherent to the human person as such, whereas intel-
lectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States
seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, en-
courage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as
well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integ-
rity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the benefit of
society as a whole.99
Given the rapid expansion of rights in the intellectual property system, it
is fair to say that many of these rights offer protection far beyond what is
required by international or regional human rights instruments.
To complicate matters even further, international and regional human
rights instruments may allow for protections that are prohibited by inter-
national trade or intellectual property treaties. A case in point is Article
2(3) of the ICESCR, which states that "[d]eveloping countries, with due
regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to
what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the
present Covenant to non-nationals."'1 Although this provision provides
state parties in the developing world flexibility to determine whether
non-nationals will receive the same protection granted to nationals for
the human rights interests resulting from intellectual productions, such
discrimination is expressly prohibited by the national treatment provi-
sions in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
98. As the CESCR elaborated:
In contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are generally of a
temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.
While under most intellectual property systems, intellectual property rights,
often with the exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time
and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited, human rights are timeless
expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person. Whereas the
human right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material inter-
ests resulting from one's scientific, literary and artistic productions safe-
guards the personal link between authors and their creations and between
peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage,
as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors
to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes prima-
rily protect business and corporate interests and investments. Moreover, the
scope of protection of the moral and material interests of the author pro-
vided for by article 15, paragraph 1(c), does not necessarily coincide with
what is referred to as intellectual property rights under national legislation or
international agreements.
It is therefore important not to equate intellectual property rights with the
human right recognized in article 15, paragraph 1(c).
General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, $1 2-3.
99. Id. $ 1.




(Paris Convention), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights1°' (TRIPS Agreement).10 2
4. Diversity Principle
The fourth principle is that the human rights framework for intellectual
property recognizes that different types of productions or endeavors may
require different forms of protection for the human rights interests in-
volved. As General Comment No. 17 recognizes and as Part III of this
article will show, many different types of scientific productions exist, and
the human rights interests resulting from these productions often require
protection through different forms of intellectual property rights. For ex-
ample, the moral and material interests in scientific publications are often
protected through the copyright system, which features both economic
and non-economic (or moral) rights. 10 3 These publications can also be
protected by trademark and unfair competition laws. By contrast, the
moral and material interests in scientific innovations are often protected
through trade secret and patent laws. 10 4
What type of intellectual property right or whether a combination of
different rights will be needed is likely to depend on the type of produc-
tion or endeavor involved. Although this article focuses mostly on scien-
tific productions, this principle is equally applicable to literary or artistic
productions. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that no rigid sepa-
ration exists between these different types of productions or endeavors.
Nor is such a separation universally accepted-for instance, many indige-
nous communities consider this separation artificial. 0 5
101. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 27-34,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, 108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
102. See Berne Convention, supra note 62, art. 5(1) ("Authors shall enjoy, in respect of
works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other
than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention."); Paris
Convention, supra note 60, art. 2(1) ("Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as
regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union
the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals;
all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this Convention. Consequently,
they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any
infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon
nationals are complied with."); TRIPS Agreement art. 3.1 ("Each Member shall accord to
the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions
already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the Berne Convention
(1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Inte-
grated Circuits.").
103. See discussion infra Part III.A.
104. See discussion infra Part II1.B.
105. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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5. Flexibility Principle
The fifth principle is that the human rights framework for intellectual
property neither requires nor endorses any particular modality of protec-
tion for the human rights interests resulting from intellectual productions.
Because of this lack of specification, the UDHR, the ICESCR, and other
international or regional human rights instruments do not endorse one
form of protection over another. After all, the effectiveness of the protec-
tion concerned is likely to depend on available resources and local condi-
tions. Thus, each state party is free to determine for itself what type of
protection will best meet the minimum requirement and suit its own local
conditions (Principle 4).
For example, General Comment No. 17 declared the following with re-
spect to the moral interests resulting from intellectual productions:
The term of protection of material interests under article 15, para-
graph 1(c), need not extend over the entire lifespan of an author.
Rather, the purpose of enabling authors to enjoy an adequate stan-
dard of living can also be achieved through one-time payments or by
vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the exclusive
right to exploit his [or her] scientific, literary or artistic
production. 0 6
Based on this interpretative comment, state parties can therefore satisfy
their human rights obligations by relying on the existing property-based
intellectual property system. They can also deploy liability rules, unfair
competition, or even Soviet-style non-property-based authorship protec-
tion. 10 7 As discussed below in regard to Principles 6 and 7, state parties
106. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 16; see also Torremans, supra note 74,
at 229 ("[A] lot of freedom is left to Contracting States in relation to the exact legal format
of th[e] protection [of the interests of authors and creators].").
107. See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Copyright and Free Speech in Transition: The Russian
Experience, in COPYRIGHT AND FREF SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANAL-
YSEs 315, 333 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005) (noting that the Russian
Copyright Act of 1928 granted limited recognition to authors' interests by "placing them
within the broader context of a non-property theory of authorship"). As noted in a 1938
commentary on the Russian Law:
In bourgeois society, the author's right is a monopoly, establishing the exclu-
sive right to distribute the products of science, literature and art....
[It] is characteristic that, except for a small group of bourgeois authors, the
author's right is the property, in bourgeois society, not of the author, but of
the publisher, of a big capitalist, an industrialist. . . . The author's right in
capitalist countries is made into a tool of the interests of the monopolist-
publisher, a means of exploiting the author and retarding the cultural growth
of the masses of the people....
The basic principles of the Soviet author's right are completely differ-
ent. ... [It] has the objective of protecting to the maximum the personal and
property interests of the author, coupled with the assurance of the widest
distribution of the product of literature, science and the arts among the
broad masses of the toilers.
A Text Writer's Opinion, in 1 GRAZHANSKOE PRAVO [Civii LAW] 254-55 (1939), trans-




may even offer protection through laws and policies outside the intellec-
tual property regime.
6. Multiplicity Principle
The sixth principle is that the human rights framework for intellectual
property anticipates a multiplicity of protections. The key criterion for
satisfying the human rights obligations implicated by this framework is
not whether a certain type of protection is offered, but whether meaning-
ful protection is available to the moral and material interests resulting
from intellectual productions. As the CESCR declared, "the protection
under article 15, paragraph 1(c), need not necessarily reflect the level and
means of protection found in present copyright, patent and other intellec-
tual property regimes, as long as the protection available is suited to se-
cure for authors the moral and material interests resulting from their
productions." 10 8
Thus, state parties enjoy a wide margin of discretion in determining
what types of laws and policies will best offer such protection. For in-
stance, although trade secret protection and patent rights immediately
come to mind when one seeks protection for scientific innovations, state
parties can easily choose to introduce other forms of protection, such as
utility models or unfair competition. State parties can also determine
whether trade secret protection has to be adjusted when patent protec-
tion is increased-perhaps due to demands unrelated to human rights
protection, such as those from recently negotiated bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral trade agreements.
In addition, state parties may consider protections outside the intellec-
tual property regime. As far as the protection for the interests resulting
from intellectual productions is concerned, there is a tendency to focus on
the protection offered under the existing intellectual property system.
Such a focus is attractive because the system already provides a wide ar-
ray of rights, such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade names, trade
secrets and other undisclosed information, geographical indications, in-
dustrial designs, plant varieties, layout designs of integrated circuits, util-
ity models, as well as protection against unfair competition.
Nevertheless, the human rights framework does not require all protec-
tions to originate from the intellectual property regime. For example, the
moral interests resulting from intellectual productions can be protected
by not only moral rights, but also unfair competition, breach of contract,
defamation law, or the right to privacy.' 0 9 Likewise, the material interests
108. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, [ 10.
109. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. Riv. 1, 17-33 (1985) [hereinafter Kwall, Copyright and
the Moral Right] (discussing the noncopyright alternatives U.S. courts relied upon before
the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 to protect a creator's moral rights,such as "unfair competition, breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy"); see
also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. Rijv. 665, 665 (1992)
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resulting from intellectual productions can be protected through alterna-
tive funding models, such as grants, subsidies, prizes, advance market
commitments, reputation gains, open source drug discovery, patent pools,
and public-private partnerships.11 0
As Professor Dreyfuss rightly reminded us:
For those who require compensation, patent rights are only one al-
ternative .... Indeed, it can be argued that patent protection is a
peculiar choice for a remuneration mechanism, given the lack of any
affirmative right to practice or license the patented invention or to
require the public to buy it."'l
In view of the existence of many non-intellectual property alternatives, it
is indeed no surprise that the CESCR went out of its way to note that
"the purpose of enabling authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living
can ... be achieved through one-time payments." ' 1 2 In her recent report
on copyright policy, the Special Rapporteur also emphasized the availa-
bility of complementary models:
Open access scholarships, open educational resources and public art
and artistic expressions are examples of approaches that treat cul-
tural production as a public endeavour for the benefit of all. Those
approaches complement the private, for-profit models of production
and distribution and have a particularly important role.11 3
7. Substitutability Principle
The final principle is that the human rights framework for intellectual
property allows state parties to substitute one form of protection with
another-be it a different intellectual property right or a different form
of protection outside the intellectual property regime. Such flexibility is
understandable, considering that international or regional human rights
instruments do not require the provision of a certain form of intellectual
property right. These instruments also mandate that protection be offered
("A common device for privatizing speech is copyright; privatization can similarly be
achieved using § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and such common law doctrines as trade secrets,
rights of privacy and publicity, and unfair trade practices." (footnotes omitted)).
110. See Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 81 ("Other methods of
assuring payment include lead time advantages, government or private contracts and re-
search grants, contests, bonuses, prizes, tenure, and professorial chairs."); Yu, Nonmulti-
lateral Era, supra note 10, at 1078 (outlining the different non-patent options); see also
GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: PATENT POOLS, CLEARING-
IIOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS AND LIABILITY REGIMES (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed.,
2009) (collecting articles discussing patent pools, clearinghouses, open source models, and
liability regimes); INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH: PAENT LAW AND ACCESS
To ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 133-283 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010) (collecting articles
discussing prizes, patent pools, and open source drug discovery); Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1088-92 (discussing the different acceptable
modalities of protection that can be used to realize the right to the protection of interests
in intellectual creations).
111. Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 81.
112. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 9 16.
113. Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 1 111.
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through the intellectual property system, as opposed to other laws and
policies.
Indeed, if questions arise over the inadequate protection of a specific
form of intellectual property right, such as the protection for pharmaceu-
tical patents or undisclosed clinical trial data, those questions are likely to
arise from requirements in the trade regime, as opposed to the human
rights regime. If alternative forms of protection already exist to secure the
human rights interests resulting from intellectual productions, those alter-
native protections can easily substitute for weaker protection for pharma-
ceutical patents or undisclosed clinical trial data. Nevertheless, the
existence of these alternative protections may not relieve state parties of
their obligations under the international minimum standards stipulated in
the TRIPS Agreement or TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, or plurilateral
trade agreements.
B. STRUCTURAL LAYERS
In addition to the seven organizing principles discussed above, this sec-
tion identifies four structural layers in the human rights framework for
intellectual property. It further conceptualizes this framework as a four-
layer hierarchical structure. Starting at the very bottom of this structure is
the production layer (see Fig. 1). As far as scientific productions are con-
cerned, this layer covers all types of scientific productions, including sci-
entific publications, scientific innovations (including inventions), and
scientific knowledge. 114 Many would also include indigenous knowledge,
innovations, and practices in the list, although such an inclusion is far
from uncontroversial.1 15 Identifying these different types of productions
or endeavors is important because each type may require different forms
of protection, including those within and outside the intellectual property





Fig. 1 Structural Layers
The second layer is the interest layer. It covers two different types of
human rights interests resulting from intellectual productions: moral and
material interests (Principle 2). While most state parties tend to offer very
114. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 91 9 (including among "scientific pro-
ductions" "scientific publications and innovations, including knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities").
115. See id.
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strong protection of the material interests-due in large part to the re-
quirements of the TRIPS Agreements as well as WIPO-administered in-
tellectual property conventions-these parties may not have offered
adequate protection to the moral interests.
The third layer is the protection layer. It covers the different forms of
protection that can be used to address the moral and material interests
resulting from intellectual productions. This layer includes not only dif-
ferent intellectual property rights, but also protections outside the intel-
lectual property regime (Principle 6). More importantly, the interaction
between this layer and the lower interest layer may provide important
insight into the interplay of intellectual property and human rights. For
instance, a top-down focus on the interaction between the upper protec-
tion layer and the lower interest layer shows how the levels of protection
in the current intellectual property regime have exceeded the require-
ments of international and regional human rights treaties. By contrast, a
bottom-up focus on the interaction between the lower interest layer and
the upper protection layer helps us locate the appropriate protection for
the specific human rights interests identified in the interest layer or deter-
mine whether alternative forms of protection exist to secure these
interests.
The final layer is the limitation layer. It covers the different limitations
on the rights covered in the protection layer. Just because the extant
rights in this layer are expansive does not mean that the human rights
framework will protect these rights to the fullest extent. Indeed, intellec-
tual property rights are limited by both endogenous and exogenous lim-its. 116 Because the interest layer already covers both the rights and their
endogenous limits, which are internalized within the intellectual property
system,' 1 7 the limitation layer covers only their exogenous limits. Exam-
ples of these limits are those found in human rights treaties, 1 8 constitu-
tions,119 competition law,120 or in relation to "morality, public order and
116. See Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84 CH-I.-KENT L. REv.
777, 794-96 (2010) (discussing the need to establish internal and external maximum limits
on intellectual property rights).
117. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (underscoring the various "built-
in First Amendment accommodations" in existing copyright law); Harper & Row, Publish-
ers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (stating that the Framers of the Consti-
tution intended copyright to be the "engine of free expression").
118. See HESTERMEYEFR, supra note 5, at 229-55 (discussing TRIPS flexibilities in rela-
tion to the protection of human rights); Correa, supra note 10 (discussing the use of human
rights obligations to mitigate the impact of high intellectual property standards in develop-
ing countries); Geertrui Van Overwalle, Human Rights' Limitations in Patent Law, in A
PARADOX, supra note 4, at 236 (discussing the human rights limitations in patent law); Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1096-99 (discussing
human rights-based compulsory licensing).
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. For excellent discussions of the relationship between
copyright law and the First Amendment, see generally sources cited in Peter K. Yu, The
Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 927 n.145 (2004).
120. See High Commissioner's Report, supra note 7, % 64; Jonathan Berger, Advancing
Public Health by Other Means: Using Competition Policy, in NI'GO'EIATING HFALTH: IN-
TEILECMICJAL PROPERTY AND ACCE SS TO MEDICINES 181, 182 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds.,
2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIAING HEAL ri-j (exploring how developing countries can use
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the general welfare in a democratic society.' 121
Consider, for instance, the human rights-based limits on intellectual
property rights. In previous works, I noted the need to separate the con-
flicts between human rights and intellectual property rights into two sets
of conflicts: external conflicts and internal conflicts. 122 While internal
conflicts exist only within the human rights regime, thereby requiring ap-
proaches to resolve competing fundamental rights, external conflicts sug-
gest that intellectual property rights have expanded beyond the
requirements of international or regional human rights instruments. Thus,
in the event of a conflict between intellectual property and human rights,
one can apply the principle of human rights primacy, which subordinates
the non-human rights aspects of intellectual property rights to human
rights obligations. The U.N. Sub-Commission endorsed this particular
principle in Resolution 2000/7 on "Intellectual Property Rights and
Human Rights."'1 23
Although this Part conceptualizes the human rights framework for in-
tellectual property as a four-layer hierarchical structure, based largely on
a positivist reading of international and regional human rights instru-
ments, the proposed organizational principles and structural layers can
competition policy to "increase access to a sustainable supply of affordable essential
medicines"); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments
and for Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach" for Linking Trade and Competition
Rules in the WTO, 72 CH.-KE-NT L. REv. 545, 563 (1996) ("[D]eveloping countries with
underdeveloped national competition and intellectual property rights laws . . . will need
more systematic rules on the protection of competition among trade-related intellectual
property rights and on the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse."); J.H. Reichman,
From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29
N.Y.U. J. IN'r'i L. & POL. 11, 52-58 (1997) (proposing to use "competition law to curb the
abuse of market power" as a pro-competitive strategy for implementing the TRIPS Agree-
ment in developing countries).
121. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 29(2) ("In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, eve-
ryone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society."); see also ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 4 ("The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in
conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limi-
tations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of
these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
society."); Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, as
amended by Decision of the Administration Council of the European Patent Organization
of Dec. 21, 1978, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255 ("European patents shall not be granted in respect
of... inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public'
or morality .... ); TRIPS Agreement art. 27.2 ("Members may exclude from patentability
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality .... ").
122. For discussions of these conflicts, see generally Yu, Nonmultilateral Era, supra note
10, at 1091-96; Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at
1075-123.
123. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, $$ 2, 3 (reminding governments "of the pri-
macy of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements" and the impor-
tance of other human rights, such as the rights to food and health); Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1092-93 (discussing the principle of human
rights primacy).
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still be used even if one subscribes to a naturalist or philosophical concep-
tualization of human rights. Under the latter approach, different layers
may exist, and each layer may interact with each other differently. In-
deed, there is no requirement that all four structural layers be present.
There is also neither a necessary structure nor a necessary relationship
between each structural layer. 124
Even if one subscribes to a positivist conceptualization of human
rights-an approach taken in this article-the structural layers could
change if the language in the underlying human rights instruments is sig-
nificantly modified. Nevertheless, given the slow and path-dependent
evolution of international and regional human rights instruments, such a
significant modification is highly unlikely in the near future.
C. ADVANTAGES
Thus far, commentators have not yet organized the human rights
framework for intellectual property into different structural layers based
on recognized principles. Nevertheless, the use of layered approaches is
not new to scholars in the intellectual property or related fields. For ex-
ample, Lawrence Solum and Minn Chung proposed "the layers princi-
ple," arguing that internet regulation should respect the integrity of the
network's underlying architecture. 125 Michael Risch also used empirical
data to demonstrate how the patent system can be better understood as a
system consisting of a complex set of layers, including enforcement, pat-
enting, and technology. 12 6
Organizing the human rights framework into structural layers based on
recognized principles has at least four advantages. First, these principles
and layers will help provide clarity to the overall framework. By compel-
ling scholars and policymakers to be clear about the specific layer they
seek to address, the proposed layered approach will facilitate a systematic
analysis of this framework. Such an analysis is particularly important con-
sidering the wide array of intellectual property rights and policy issues
involved. The debate on the protection of traditional knowledge and
traditional cultural expressions, for instance, has "impact[ed] on a wide
variety of policy areas, including agricultural productivity, biological di-
versity, cultural patrimony, food security, environmental sustainability,
business ethics, global competition, human rights, international trade,
public health, scientific research, sustainable development, and wealth
distribution. ,127
Second, the proposed layered approach will underscore the complexity
of the debate on intellectual property and human rights. As the past dec-
124. Thanks to Joshua Sarnoff for pushing the Author on this particular point.
125. See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004).
126. See Michael Risch, The Layered Patent System, 101 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2016).
127. Peter K. Yu, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture:
An Introduction, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 239, 240 (2003).
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ade has shown, this debate is no longer solely about the human rights
impact of intellectual property protection, although such an impact re-
mains of considerable concern. The debate has also moved beyond
whether intellectual property rights are human rights. After all, some as-
pects of these rights have human rights status while the other aspects do
not (Principle 1). Indeed, given the groundwork commentators have al-
ready laid down in regard to this debate, it is about time we had a much
more sophisticated and nuanced debate concerning issues lying at the in-
tersection of intellectual property and human rights.
Third, the identification of the different layers in the human rights
framework enables policymakers and commentators to see more clearly
the framework's different orientation from that of an intellectual prop-
erty regime. The intellectual property regime is a top-down regime that
starts with the protection layer. As a result, some of the protections avail-
able in this regime are simply economic rights with no human rights basis.
By contrast, the human rights regime is a bottom-up regime that starts
with individual contributions through literary, artistic, or scientific pro-
ductions. Once we identify these contributions in the production layer,
we will have to locate the different human rights interests in these contri-
butions before finally figuring out how to protect these interests.
Thus, if we take a bottom-up approach that is common to the human
rights regime, the protections available in the intellectual property system
will not only have more support and legitimacy, but it will also align bet-
ter with the needs of individual authors and inventors, creative and inven-
tive communities, and society at large. It is therefore no surprise that the
U.N. Sub-Commission, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
the CESCR, the Special Rapporteur, and legal commentators have all
advocated the use of human rights to curb the excess of intellectual prop-
erty law and policy. 128
Finally, the multiple layers in the human rights framework will pave the
way for a further exploration of the complex interrelationships between
the different layers. The previous section already discussed the different
insights one can draw from the interaction between the interest and pro-
tection layers based on whether a top-down or bottom-up approach is to
be used. Although this article does not allow for a greater exploration of
128. See, e.g., Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, T 3 (reminding governments "of the
primacy of human rights obligations over economic policies and agreements"); General
Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 2 ("In contrast to human rights, intellectual property
rights are generally of a temporary nature ... and can be revoked .... "); High Commis-
sioner's Report, supra note 7, 60 ("Members should . .. implement the minimum stan-
dards of the TRIPS Agreement bearing in mind both their human rights obligations as well
as the flexibility inherent in the TRIPS Agreement, and recognizing that 'human rights are
the first responsibility of Governments."'); Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Pol-
icy, supra note 11, $$ 94-98 (noting the need to "[einsur[e] the compatibility of copyright
laws with human rights"); Correa, supra note 10 (discussing the use of human rights obliga-
tions to mitigate the impact of high intellectual property standards in developing coun-
tries); Van Overwalle, supra note 118 (discussing the human rights limitations in patent
law).
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the interaction between these layers, the insights drawn from a further
exploration of the interrelationship between and among these layers are
likely to be conducive to developing a more robust and sophisticated
human rights framework for intellectual property.
In the Anglo-American tradition, the primary justification for intellec-
tual property protection remains utilitarian or instrumental. 12 9 Greater
protection of intellectual property rights is needed to provide incentives
to enable individual creators and inventors to engage in literary, artistic,
and scientific productions. The interrelationship between the production
and protection layers can be analyzed both theoretically and empirically.
This interrelationship, for example, is the focus of a number of recent
empirical studies. 130 The more difficult question concerns the interest
layer, which falls uncomfortably between the production and protection
layers. How this layer interacts with the other two layers deserves our
greater attention.
To be fair, this layered framework does not explain how much intellec-
tual property protection a country should offer. What level of protection
will be optimal is, by and large, an economic inquiry. Its outcome often
varies from country to country; it may also depend on the type of industry
or scientific production. Among the oft-cited influential factors are the
country's economic conditions, imitative or innovative capacity, produc-
tive and research capabilities, and institutional and budgetary
constraints.'31
129. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87ri CONG., lS-T SESS., COI'YRIGrT LAW REVISION
5 (Comm. Print 1961) (stating that the primary purpose of copyright is "to foster the crea-
tion and dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare"); see also Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) ("'The ultimate aim is... to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."' (quoting Twentieth Century Mu-
sic Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))).
130. See, e.g., JESSICA SInIEY, Tiie EUREKA MYTHi: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND
EVERYDAY [NrELLI-CTUAL PROPERTY (2014) (exploring the relationships between intel-
lectual property law and creative and innovative activities based on fieldwork involving
artists, scientists, as well as their employers, lawyers and managers); Christopher J. Buc-
cafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CIII. L. REv. 31 (2011)
(providing the results of an experiment demonstrating that intellectual property transac-
tions are subject to a creativity effect-"a valuation anomaly ... that may affect the way in
which the originators of creative works assign value to their creations"); Christopher J.
Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96
CORNELL L. Riv. 1 (2010) (providing the results of an experiment demonstrating that a
substantial valuation asymmetry exists between creators and purchasers of intellectual
property, with creators valuing their work more than twice as highly as potential buyers
do); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Re-
sults of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 1255 (2009) (drawing on
the responses of 1,332 technology startups to show the varied and subtle reasons for using
the patent system, including whether it is used to provide an "incentive to invent").
131. See Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual
Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAI PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECIINOLOGY 89, 93-97 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee &
Roberta A. Schoen eds., 1993) (arguing that countries should tailor intellectual property
protection to their economic needs, productive and research capabilities, and institutional
and budgetary constraints); David Silverstein, Intellectual Property Rights, Trading Patterns
and Practices, Wealth Distribution, Development and Standards of Living: A North-South
Perspective on Patent Law Harmonization, in INTIRNATIONAL TRADE AND INTELLECTUAl
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Nevertheless, when the proposed framework reveals that the level of
intellectual property protection has far exceeded what is supported by the
human rights interests, the discrepancy will call into doubt the necessity
of the excess protection. Such protection will also raise questions about
the justification and expediency of the existing intellectual property sys-
tem. In fact, if conflicts arise between the protection offered by this sys-
tem and the protection of other human rights interests, the country's
international human rights obligations will require policymakers to make
appropriate adjustment to the intellectual property system to ensure that
the obligations be properly discharged. 132 As the Special Rapporteur suc-
cinctly stated in her recent report on patent policy, "The human rights
perspective demands that patents do not extend so far as to interfere with
individuals' dignity and well-being. Where patent rights and human rights
are in conflict, human rights must prevail. ' 133
III. ILLUSTRATIONS INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIONS
To illustrate the organizing principles and structural layers discussed in
Part II, this Part provides illustrations from four different types of scien-
tific productions: (1) scientific publications; (2) scientific innovations (in-
cluding inventions); (3) scientific knowledge; and (4) indigenous
knowledge, innovations, and practices. The analysis begins with the pro-
duction layer before proceeding to the interest layer and then the protec-
tion layer. This analysis, however, does not examine the limitation layer,
as the exogenous limits to intellectual property rights, while important
and varied, tend to operate the same way regardless of the type of scien-
tific production involved.
Although this Part focuses only on scientific productions, the same or-
ganizing principles and structural layers can apply to artistic or literary
productions. After all, the human rights framework for intellectual prop-
erty cover the moral and material interests resulting from any type of
production-be it literary, artistic, or scientific.
A. SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS
As with all scientific productions, scientific publications involve two
different types of human rights interests: moral and material interests.
Moral interests in scientific publications are generally protected by moral
PoPiiwry: Ti-nE SEARCH FOR A BALANCE) SYST.M 155, 156 (George R. Stewart, Myra J.
Tawfik & Maureen Irish eds., 1994) ("[A] truly successful [intellectual property] system
must be culturally-specific and responsive to the different economic and social realities of
each country."); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 INI). L.J. 827, 889
(2007) ("[B]ecause of the differences in economic conditions, imitative capacity, and re-
search and development productivities, an innovative model that works well in developed
countries often does not suit the needs and interests of less developed countries." (footnote
omitted)).
132. See discussion infra Part I.B (discussing the limitation layer and the human rights
limits on intellectual property rights).
133. Special Rapporteur's Report on Patent Policy, supra note 17, summary.
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rights.134 For instance, the right of attribution (le droit d la paterniti) en-
sures the proper identification and attribution of a creative work. 135 The
right of integrity (le droit au respect de l'ceuvre) prevents that work from
being distorted, mutilated, or otherwise modified in a manner that would
prejudice the author's honor or reputation. 136 If these rights are unavaila-
ble, they can be substituted with alternative forms of protection. For ex-
ample, although pre-World War II Russia did not recognize economic
rights in copyrighted works, it recognized some forms of non-property-
based authorial protection. 137 As noted earlier, one could also protect
moral interests through unfair competition, breach of contract, defama-
tion law, or the right to privacy. 138
Limitations
Intellectual Property Rights (Copyrights + Others)
F Moral Interests Material Intcrcsts
Scientific Publications
Fig. 2 Scientific Publications 39
Material interests in scientific publications are generally protected by
economic rights in the copyright system. In the United States, for in-
stance, the system protects the rights to reproduce, distribute, adapt, pub-
licly display, publicly perform, and digitally transmit creative works.140
These rights remain important and widely recognized throughout the
134. The Special Rapporteur's recent report on copyright policy, however, suggested
that moral rights alone may not adequately protect the authors' moral interests:
Copyright regimes may under-protect the moral interests of authors because
producers/publishers/distributors and other "subsequent right-holders" typi-
cally exercise more influence over law-making than individual creators, and
may have opposing interests when it comes to those rights. That makes it
important to look beyond moral rights already recognized in copyright re-
gimes to discern additional or stronger moral interests from a human rights
standpoint, such as, in particular, the interest of artists and researchers in
creative, artistic and academic freedom, freedom of expression, and personal
autonomy.
Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 38.
135. See Berne Convention, supra note 62, art. 6bis(1) (protecting "the right to claim
authorship of the work").
136. See id. (protecting "the right ... to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation").
137. See discussion supra note 107.
138. See Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 109, at 17-33.
139. The length of the bars in Figures 2 to 4 may vary, depending on one's perspective
on the scope of coverage in each layer as well as the level of protection under the existing
intellectual property system. For example, some observers may find certain bars too long
while others may find them too short. The goal of these figures is not to state precisely the
length of each bar. Rather, it is to further an understanding of how the different layers
operate and interact with each other.
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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world-thanks to their historical evolution and the repeated transplant of
trade norms, such as through the TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus bi-
lateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements. Nevertheless, the human
rights framework does not prevent copyright protection from being re-
placed by other forms of protection (Principle 7).
Finally, scientific publications inherently cover scientific knowledge,
which Part III.C will discuss in greater detail. In virtually all jurisdictions,
the copyright system distinguishes between ideas and expressions and be-
tween facts and expressions. The lack of protection of ideas therefore re-
mains a key "ceiling" for copyright protection. For example, Article 9(2)
of the TRIPS Agreement states that "[c]opyright protection shall extend
to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or
mathematical concepts as such.' 1 4 1 Article 10 further provides that the
protection of "[c]ompilations of data or other material ... shall not ex-
tend to the data or material itself. '142
The free availability of scientific data is particularly important to scien-
tific productions. As Richard Claude observed:
Intellectual property rights related to science should promote scien-
tific progress and broad access to its benefits. To do so, these protec-
tions must respect the free exchange of scientific data indispensable
for scientific research and creative activity. Intellectual property re-
gimes must also encourage the development of international contacts
and co-operation in the scientific field.' 43
B. SCIENTIFIC INNOVATIONS (INCLUDING INVENTIONS)
Similar to scientific publications, scientific innovations (including in-
ventions) involve two different types of interests: moral and material in-
terests. The protection of moral interests in scientific innovations is
particularly challenging because these innovations are widely covered by
the patent system and no direct moral right equivalents exist in this sys-
tem. Although first inventors are generally recognized in patents-thus
suggesting some form of protection for attribution-subsequent inventors
are not. Even worse, neither first nor subsequent inventors can protect
the integrity of their inventions.
As if the lack of integrity rights were not harmful enough, inventors
may not always be recognized for their contributions. A continuous de-
bate exists about who actually invented some of the most important in-
ventions in the past two centuries, ranging from the steam engine to the
cotton gin and from the telegraph to the radio. ' 4 Those sympathetic to
African American inventors have also questioned whether the patent sys-
tem has been historically biased against minority inventors to the point
that they have largely failed to recognize the moral interests of these
141. TRIPS Agreement art. 9(2).
142. Id. art. 10.
143. Claude, supra note 38, at 319.
144. See Lemley, Myth of the Sole Inventor, supra note 47, at 715-33.
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inventors.1 45
By contrast, the material interests in scientific innovations receive
more considerable protection. Such interests are generally protected by
either trade secret or patent law. Trade secret law protects undisclosed
information that has commercial value as long as the inventors take rea-
sonable steps to keep the information secret. 146 If the inventors prefer
not to keep their innovations secret, they could secure a limited term of
property rights in the inventions through the patent system in exchange
for the disclosure of those inventions. The secured rights would allow
them to exclude others from manufacturing, distributing, importing, sell-
ing, or offering to sell their patented inventions.' 47
Limitations
Intellectual Property Rights (Patents + Others)
Moral Interests I Material Interests
Scientific Innovations (Including Inventions)
Fig. 3 Scientific Innovations
In addition to trade secret and patent laws, other forms of protection
exist. Jerome Reichman, for instance, developed a pioneering proposal
for using compensatory liability rules to address problems concerning the
protection of traditional knowledge and subpatentable inventions. 148
Under his proposal, second comers will be required "to pay equitable
compensation for borrowed improvements over a relatively short period
145. See Lateef Mtima, An Introduction to Intellectual Property Social Justice and En-
trepreneurship: Civil Rights and Economic Empowerment for the 21st Century, in INTEI-
IIFCTUAI PROPERTY, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: FROM SWORDS TO
PLOUc;IISHARES 1, 15-16 (Lateef Mtima ed., 2015) ("Slaves, being property themselves,
could not hold patents as a matter of law. From Bessie Smith to Elijah McCoy to Henrietta
Lacks, the artistic revelations, technological inventions, scientific contributions and en-
trepreneurial innovations of African Americans have been systematically misappropriated
or undermined by majority enterprises and individuals who enjoy the advantages of racial
and financial capital."); Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Prop-
erty Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 717, 722 (2007) (discussing the invention of the cotton gin and the role of black
inventors in the early days of the U.S. patent system); K.J. Greene, Idea Theft: Frivolous
Copyright-Lite Claims, or Hollywood Business Model?, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECII. L.J. 119,
125 (noting that the phrase "real McCoy" "refers to an uncredited black inventor").
146. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 39.2; UNHF. TPADE SECRETs ACr (amended 1985),
14 U.L.A. 536 (2005).
147. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement art. 28.1(a); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
148. See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Sub-
patentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1776-91 (2000) [hereinafter Reichman, Of
Green Tulips]. This proposal has been further extended to address problems concerning
the protection of traditional knowledge. See Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using
Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to
Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GooDs, supra note 59, at 337, 348-65.
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of time."149 Unlike the property-based intellectual property system, his
alternative regime "could stimulate investment without chilling follow-on
innovation and without creating legal barriers to entry." 150
Outside the intellectual property regime, commentators have also
called for the use of alternative forms of protection, such as grants, subsi-
dies, prizes, and open source arrangements. 5 1 Although these protec-
tions do not reside in the intellectual property regime, they may provide
inventors with the needed protection of their material interests.
Pat=Patent Protection / XIP=Non-IP Protection / XP=Non-Patent Protection
UT=Undisclosed Information / Inv=Investment-based Protection
F Limitations
Pat XIP XP Pat UI Inv
Moral Interests Material Intcrcsts
Scientific Innovations (Including Inventions)
Fig. 4 Scientific Innovations (with Substitutable Protections)
To further complicate matters, scientific innovations are often broadly
defined in non-intellectual property fields, such as economics and devel-
opment studies. As a result, these innovations could include types of in-
novations that do not meet the standards found in intellectual property
laws and treaties. For example, imitations could be considered innova-
tions, even though such imitations often lack novelty. Nevertheless, from
the standpoint of developing a human rights framework for intellectual
property, it is important to recognize the human rights interests involved
regardless of whether these innovations meet the requirements of the in-
tellectual property system.
Finally, like scientific publications, scientific innovations inherently
cover scientific knowledge, which Part III.C will further discuss. Similar
to the idea-expression or fact-expression dichotomy in copyright law, pat-
ent protection is generally not extended to "laws of nature, natural phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas.' 52 Although the Paris Convention does not
define what constitutes an invention, 153 Article 27.2 of the TRIPS Agree-
149. Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 148, at 1777.
150. Id. at 1746.
151. See sources cited supra note 110.
152. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("This Court has undoubtedly
recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas."); see also Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights, supra note 32, at 73 ("[A]t least on
the patent side, there is little reason to think that the human rights concerns associatedwith creative labor must be furthered by recognizing a right to full control over informa-
tion that creative labor produces.").
153. See Gervais, Human Rights, supra note 51, at 91 ("[The Paris Convention] is
mostly about applications for a registration of patent, design and trademark rights. It fails
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ment, which incorporated the Convention by reference, allows WTO
member states to "exclude from patentability inventions, the preven-
tion ... of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect
ordre public or morality.' 1 54 Article 27.3 further allows these states to
exclude from patentability "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods
for the treatment of humans or animals" as well as "essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biologi-
cal and microbiological processes.' 1 55
C. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The protection of scientific knowledge is highly controversial.' 56 In-
deed, because human rights instruments only protect "the moral and ma-
terial interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production
of which he [or she] is the author,"1 57 one could debate whether scientific
knowledge is part of the protected authorial production. For instance, if
the knowledge concerned is purely scientific, the one who discovers or
acquires such knowledge can hardly be considered its author.
The reluctance to protect scientific knowledge, especially the material
interests in such knowledge, is understandable. As Framer Thomas Jeffer-
son, the author of the 1793 Patent Act and the "first administrator of [the
U.S.] patent system,"'1 58 wrote in his famous 1813 letter to inventor Isaac
McPherson:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the
progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be
claimed in exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any one
thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the
action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may
exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment
it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the
receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is
that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the
whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine,
receives light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread
to provide even a definition of what is protected (terms such as 'patent' and
'trademark').").
154. TRIPS Agreement art. 27(2).
155. Id. art. 27(3).
156. This section does not provide any figure for scientific knowledge. If such a figure is
to be provided, the four layers will remain the same. It remains unclear, however, how
much protection will be available in the protection layer. Although intellectual property
rights generally do not protect scientific knowledge, the protection for ideas, knowhow,
and trade secrets is available through intellectual property laws, knowhow contracts, and
technological protection measures. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 179-182.
It is also debatable how much of the protection layer is covered by the limitation layer,
thereby rendering the laws and protective measures identified in the protection layer
inappropriate.
157. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(2); ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 15(l)(c).
158. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
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from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual in-
struction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have
been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she
made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening
their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move,
and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive
appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of
property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising
from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the
will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from
anybody. 159
This portion of Jefferson's letter was quoted in full in the seminal case of
Graham v. John Deere Co.,' 60 in which the U.S. Supreme Court clarified
the non-obviousness requirement of the patent system.
Moreover, just because the moral interests resulting from scientific
productions should be protected does not mean that the material interests
should also be protected to the same extent. It is no coincidence that the
human rights framework separates the moral interests from the material
interests (Principle 2). Indeed, the disclosure of scientific knowledge is
the quid pro quo that has been repeatedly used to justify the need for a
limited monopoly in the copyright or patent system. Regardless of the
system, however, there is a general expectation that the protection is for
limited duration.
More importantly, even when intellectual property rights are granted,
limitations and exceptions exist in the copyright or patent system to allow
others to use scientific knowledge under specified conditions. These con-
ditions include fair use,' 61 exhaustion of rights, 62 exceptions for re-
search,163 early working, 164 and the development of diagnostics, 165 as well
159. Id. at 8 n.2; see also Mossoff, Thomas Jefferson, supra note 68, at 959-67 (discuss-
ing the Jeffersonian story of patent law).
160. 383 U.S. at 8 n.2.
161. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
162. See, e.g., id. § 109(a).
163. See Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2005 and Beyond, in Ni-
GOFIATING HEA'TH, supra note 120, at 41, 52 (noting the need for "a research exemp-
tion"). For discussions of the experimental use exemption, see generally Rochelle
Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use
Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIz. L. Rijv. 457 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CIi. L. RI-v. 1017
(1989); Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Excep-
tion to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WAsi. L. Riv. 1 (2001);
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bar-
gain, 2004 Wis. L. Ri-v. 81.
164. See COMM'N ON INTI!LLECIUAL PROP. RiGtris, INTEGRATING INFLLECI'UAL
PROEI'RTY RIGHTS AN) DEVi OPMEN'NT POLIcy 50 (2002) (discussing the importance of
the Bolar exception, which "makes it legal for a generic producer to import, manufacture
and test a patented product prior to the expiry of the patent in order that it may fulfill theregulatory requirements imposed by particular countries as necessary for marketing as a
generic").
165. See TRIPS Agreement art. 27.3(a) ("Members may ... exclude from patentabil-
ity ... diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or ani-
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as special arrangements for compulsory licensing, parallel importation,
and government use.166 These conditions are particularly important be-
cause the intellectual property system aims to promote dissemination of
knowledge and transfer of technology. In the TRIPS Agreement, Article
7 expressly states its objectives as follows:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advan-
tage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance
of rights and obligations.1 67
To further complicate matters, the UDHR, the ICESCR, and other in-
ternational or regional human rights instruments have all recognized the
right to "enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.' 6 8
If scientific knowledge could be completely protected, it is difficult to see
how one could still enjoy and exercise this important right. As the Special
Rapporteur reminded us:
The right to have access to scientific knowledge is pivotal for the
realization of the right to science. At the juncture of the right to edu-
cation and the right to information, it implies a right to science edu-
cation, understood as a right to be introduced to and informed about
main scientific discoveries and their applications, regardless of fron-
tiers. It also entails education instilling a spirit of scientific inquiry.
Popularizing science outside schooling is also important. Interesting
measures such as "science week", the introduction of "science cafes"
and the opening of science museums with specific educational ap-
proaches contribute to this objective.' 69
mals .... "); EDSON BEAS RODRIGUES JR., TIlE GENERAl. EXCEPTION CLAUSES OF THIEI
TRIPS AGREEMENT: PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 159-236 (2012) (discuss-
ing the R&D and genetic diagnostic test exceptions).
166. See ELLEN F.M. 'T HOEN, TIlE GLOBAL POI-TICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL MONOP-
OLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND TIE APPLICATION OF THE WTO
DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLic HEALII 39-59 (2009) (discussing compul-
sory licenses and parallel importation in relation to flexibilities under the TRIPS
Agreement).
167. TRIPS Agreement art. 7; see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the
TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. REV. 979, 1000-08 (2009) (discussing Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement). Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement is highly important because the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
168. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 27(1); ICESCR, supra note 19, art. 15(1)(b).
169. Special Rapporteur's Report on the Right to Science, supra note 25, 27 (footnotes
omitted); see also id. II 65 ("The Special Rapporteur stresses the need to guard against
promoting the privatization of knowledge to an extent that deprives individuals of oppor-
tunities to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the fruits of scientific progress, which
would also impoverish society as whole."); Claude, supra note 38, at 259 ("[T]he State
obligation to ensure the 'development of science' necessarily involves the right to educa-
tion, a wellspring from which science is developed as an activity beneficial to human-
kind."); id. at 267-68 (discussing science education).
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To some extent, the need for access to scientific knowledge has raised
questions about how to resolve competing human rights. On the one
hand, the human rights instruments recognize the right to the protection
of the interests resulting from scientific productions. On the other hand,
those instruments also recognize the right to enjoy the benefits of scien-
tific progress and its applications. Although this article does not allow for
a further exploration of how to resolve conflicts between competing
rights within the human rights framework, such resolution is likely to play
a very important role in the debate on intellectual property and human
rights.
Thus far, commentators have employed different approaches to resolve
these conflicts. For example, they have discussed the distinction between
true conflicts and false conflicts, drawing on conflict-of-law jurisprudence
and scholarship.1 70 They have also explored the use of hierarchies, 71 bal-
ancing techniques, 72 the proportionality doctrine,1 7 3 and interpretations
170. See Sharon E. Foster, The Conflict Between the Human Right to Education and
Copyright, in INTILLEIJA-CTUAI PROPER-TY AND HUMAN RIGHTvrS, supra note 4, at 335, 365-66
(arguing that market failures can precipitate false conflicts).
171. For discussions of the use of hierarchies to prioritize and resolve conflicts between
competing human rights, see generally Peggy Ducoulombier, Conflicts Between Fundamen-
tal Rights and the European Court of Human Rights: An Overview, in CONFLICTs BI' rwI7N
FUNDAMENTAL RiGirs 217 (Eva Brems ed., 2008) thereinafter CONFI icTs BETWEEN FUN-
DAMENTAL RiGiITS]; Peggy Ducoulombier, Interaction Between Human Rights: Are All
Human Rights Equal?, in RESIARCHI HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 39. But see World Con-
ference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/
Get?Open&DS=A/CONF.157/23&Lang=E ("All human rights are universal, indivisible
and interdependent and interrelated."); Policy on Competing Human Rights, ONTARIO
HUM. RTis. COMMISSION, http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-competing-human-rights [https://
perma.cc/83H2-M789] (including as a key legal principle that "[t]here is no hierarchy of
rights").
172. See generally JAcco BOMtIOv - , BALANCING CONSFITUTIONAL RiTi-S: TIII ORI-
GINS AND MEANINGS OF POSTWAR LEGAL DIScOURSE (2013) (providing a historical and
comparative analysis of how U.S. and German courts balanced constitutional rights after
the Second World War); Leto Cariolou, The Search for an Equilibrium by the European
Court of Human Rights, in CONFLIc-rs BiIWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHIS, supra note 171,
at 249 (discussing the balancing approach used by the European Court of Human Rights);
Thilo Marauhn & Nadine Ruppel, Balancing Conflicting Human Rights: Konrad Hesse's
Notion of "Praktische Konkordanz" and the German Federal Constitutional Court, in CON-
El IC'S BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGiTS, supra note 171, at 273 (discussing how the Ger-
man notion of "praktische konkordanz" (practical concordance) can be used to balance
not only conflicting rights but also human rights with other competing interests).
173. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 9 23 ("Limitations must therefore be
proportionate, meaning that the least restrictive measures must be adopted when several
types of limitations may be imposed." (emphasis added)); Jonas Christoffersen, Human
Rights and Balancing: The Principle of Proportionality, in RI-SFAzc-'H HANDBOOK, supra
note 4, at 19 (discussing the use of the proportionality principle to balance conflicting inter-
ests and adjudicate disputes placed before the European Court of Human Rights); Hen-
ning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Proportionality and Balancing Within the Objectives for
Intellectual Property Protection, in INTELILECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGITS, supra
note 4, at 185 (calling for the use of proportional balancing as a guiding principle in the
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement); Wouter Vandenhole, Conflicting Economic and
Social Rights: The Proportionality Plus Test, in CONFLICrS BETI-WEEN FUNDAMI-NTAL
RIcin'S, supra note 171, at 559 (calling for the introduction of a "proportionality plus test,"
which prioritizes vulnerable groups and emphasizes the core of the rights).
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by reference to external norms-such as scientific norms in relation to
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.' 7 4
In addition, the Ontario Human Rights Commission introduced a Policy
on Competing Human Rights,1 75 which outlines a process for reconciling
competing human rights claims and providing case-by-case accommoda-
tion of individual and group rights. In an earlier work, I also outlined
three different approaches that can be used to resolve these conflicts: (1)
just remuneration; (2) core minimum; and (3) progressive realization.176
174. See Amy Kapczynski, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, Remarks at the Work-
shop on "Patent Regimes and the Right to Science and Culture," Yale Law School (Oct.
29, 2014). In a widely cited 1942 essay, Robert Merton stated that "[f]our sets of institu-
tional imperatives-universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism-
are taken to comprise the ethos of modern science." ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative
Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THiiORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL IN-
VESrIIATIoNs 267, 270 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). As he declared:
The institutional conception of science as part of the public domain is linked
with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is the antithesis
of this norm; full and open communication its enactment. The pressure for
diffusion of results is reenforced by the institutional goal of advancing the
boundaries of knowledge and by the incentive of recognition which is, of
course, contingent upon publication. A scientist who does not communicate
his important discoveries to the scientific fraternity . . . becomes the target
for ambivalent responses. He is esteemed for his talent and, perhaps, for his
modesty. But, institutionally considered, his modesty is seriously misplaced,
in view of the moral compulsive for sharing the wealth of science.
Id. at 274. For discussions of scientific norms in relation to intellectual property protection,
see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Bio-
technology Research, 97 YA i, L.J. 177 (1987); Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63
DUKE L.J. 1 (2013); Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights
and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1999).
175. Policy on Competing Human Rights, supra note 171. The Policy articulated eight"main legal principles that organizations must consider when they deal with competing
rights situations":
1. No rights are absolute
2. There is no hierarchy of rights
3. Rights may not extend as far as claimed
4. The full context, facts and constitutional values at stake must be
considered
5. Must look at extent of interference (only actual burdens on rights trigger
conflicts)
6. The core of a right is more protected than its periphery
7. Aim to respect the importance of both sets of rights
8. Statutory defences may restrict rights of one group and give rights to
another.
Id.
176. See Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at
1094-123. As I explained in an earlier work:
The just remuneration approach is ideal for situations involving an inevitable
conflict between two human rights-for example, between the right to the
protection of interests in intellectual creations and the right to freedom of
expression. Under this approach, authors and inventors hold a right to remu-
neration (rather than exclusive control) while individuals obtain a human
rights-based compulsory license (as compared to a free license). The core
minimum approach, in contrast, provides guidance on the minimum essential
levels of protection a state has to offer to comply with its human rights obli-
gations. That approach seeks to balance the state's obligations against the
inevitable constraints created by a scarcity of natural and economic re-
sources. Finally, the progressive realization approach offers insight into the
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Under the just remuneration approach, for instance, authors and inven-
tors hold a right to remuneration (rather than exclusive control) while
individuals obtain a human rights-based compulsory license (as opposed
to a free license). 177
Finally, just because the protection of scientific knowledge is contro-
versial and considered inappropriate by many does not mean that such
knowledge cannot, and will not, be legally protected. For example, Peter
Lee reminded us that, "[f]ollowing World War I, there was an interna-
tional movement, primarily based in Europe, to protect 'scientific prop-
erty' with exclusive rights."'1 78 Even today, many jurisdictions, especially
WTO member states, have laws protecting trade secrets and other undis-
closed information.' 79 In addition, knowhow contracts and technological
protection measures have been widely used to protect ideas, 180 despite
criticisms by the Special Rapporteur and other commentators.' 8 1 In the
past decade, some commentators have also explored the need for greater
protection of ideas.' 82
non-competing relationship amongst the different rights protected in interna-
tional or regional human rights treaties. This final approach is important, be-
cause human rights are not only universal entitlements, but also
empowerment rights-rights that enable individuals to benefit from other
equally important rights.
Yu, Ten Common Questions, supra note 7, at 712-13 (footnotes omitted).
177. See Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1096-99;
Yu, Ten Common Questions, supra note 7, at 712; see also Alan B. Bennett, Reservation of
Rights for Humanitarian Uses, in 1 INTILILEC'UAL PROiERTv MANAGEMENT IN HEAL TH
AND AGRICULTURE INNOVATION 41, 41 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) (discussing
ways to reserve rights to meet the needs of developing countries for other humanitarian
purposes); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & Trci-j.
301, 350-51 (2011) (discussing "humanitarian licensing").
178. Lee, supra note 174, at 12. For discussions of the efforts to develop the interna-
tional protection of "scientific property," see generally C.J. HAMSON, PATENT Ricarrs FOR
SCIFNTHnIc DiscoviRinirs 21-29 (1930); Stephen B. Ladas, The Efforts for International
Protection of Scientific Property, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (1929); John H. Wigmore & Fran-
cesco Ruffini, Scientific Property, 22 ILli. L. Rnv. 355, 355 (1927).
179. See TRIPS Agreement art. 39 (stipulating the international minimum standards for
the protection of undisclosed information).
180. See Peter K. Yu, Five Disharmonizing Trends in the International Intellectual Prop-
erty Regime, in 4 INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND INIFORMATION WEALTH, supra note 58, at
73, 91-96 (discussing the trend of rights holders using mass-market contracts and techno-
logical protection measures).
181. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 9 107
("States should ensure that exceptions and limitations cannot be waived by contract, or
unduly impaired by technical measures of protection or online contracts in the digital envi-
ronment."); Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 D:,NV. U. L.
Ri-v. 13, 40-57 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention] (dis-
cussing the problems technology protection measures have posed to users in developing
countries).
182. For discussions of such protection, see generally Robert C. Denicola, The New
Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J.L. & Tici i. 195 (2014); Greene, supra note 145; Arthur R.
Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An "Idea" Whose Time Has
Come, 119 HARV. L. Ri-V. 705 (2006). These discussions are, by no means, new. See Mel-
ville B. Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L. Ri7v. 119 (1954) (outlining the different
legal theories used by courts to protect ideas).
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D. INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE, INNOVATIONS, AND PRACTICES
Like scientific knowledge, the protection of indigenous knowledge, in-
novations, and practices is highly controversial.' 83 Apart from the debate
on whether this type of production is scientific at all, such protection has
raised four sets of highly complex and difficult-to-resolve questions. First,
no clear distinction exists between scientific publications and scientific in-
novations. Also unclear is the distinction between copyright and patent or
between traditional cultural expression and traditional knowledge. Many
indigenous communities, for instance, do not make these distinctions,
considering them artificial.' 84
Second, indigenous communities may not distinguish between moral
and material interests. Nor do they always pay attention to material inter-
ests, given their reluctance to commodify knowledge, innovations, and
practices. 8 5 Nevertheless, compensation and benefit sharing remain an
183. Like the earlier section, this section does not provide any figure for indigenous
knowledge, innovations, and practices. If such a figure is to be provided, the four layers
will remain the same. It remains unclear, however, how much protection will be available
in the protection layer, given the ongoing negotiations surrounding the protection of ge-
netic resources, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions. See discussion
infra text accompanying notes 192-196.
184. As WIPO noted in its booklet on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions:
While in discussions about [intellectual property] protection, TCEs [tradi-
tional cultural expressions] are generally discussed distinctly from TK [tradi-
tional knowledge], this is not to suggest that these are distinguished in the
traditional context. The distinction between TK and TCEs does not necessa-
rily represent any of the particular holders' holistic comprehension of their
own integrated heritage. For many holders, TK and its form of expression are
seen as an inseparable whole. For example, a traditional tool may embody
TK but also may be seen as a TCE in itself because of its design and
ornamentation.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PUB. No. 933(E), INTEI ECTUAL PROPERTY AND GE-
NETIC RESOURcEs, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND TRADITIONAL CuirURAi. ExPREs-
SIONS 13 (2015); see also Christoph Antons, Introduction to TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE,
TRADITIONAL CULTURAL EXPRESSIONS, ANI) INTEl ECIUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIc REGION 1, 4 (Christoph Antons ed., 2009) ("Th[e] distinction between traditional
knowledge 'in the strict sense' and [traditional cultural expressions] has frequently been
criticized and analysts have pointed out that in the world-view of many indigenous and
local communities, cultural expressions are inseparable from the social and natural envi-
ronment, in which they are produced.").
185. As Erica-Irene Daes, the former Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, observed:
[I]ndigenous peoples challenge the fundamental assumptions of globaliza-
tion. They do not accept the assumption that humanity will benefit from the
construction of a world culture of consumerism. Indigenous peoples are
acutely aware, from their own tragic experience over the past five hundred
years, that consumer societies grow and prosper at the expense of other peo-
ples and the environment. Indigenous peoples realize that the cancer of con-
sumerism is fundamentally dependent upon "eating other people's future,"
as the great Bengali philosopher Tagore once put it. In fact, most of the in-
digenous peoples I meet are opposed to the phrase "sustainable develop-
ment," which they regard as a code phrase for the illusory goal of continuous
growth of human consumption.
Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 AM. Soc'Y IN r'L PROC.
143, 143 (2001); see also U.N. Econ. & Social Council, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Dis-
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important part of the debate on traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions. 186 It would indeed be misleading to claim that indig-
enous communities have no interest in protecting the material interests in
their knowledge, innovations, and practices.
Third, there remains a lack of consensus on what type of law or policy
should be used to protect indigenous knowledge, innovations, and prac-
tices. Although strong arguments exist to allow indigenous communities
to determine for themselves what type of protection should be availa-
ble,187 indigenous communities have yet to achieve a consensus on how
their knowledge, innovations, and practices are to be protected. Nor have
indigenous communities across the world agreed on how such protection
is to be secured at the global level.
Finally, it is difficult to draw the line between indigenous knowledge
and indigenous innovations and practices. While the protection of the lat-
ter will present fewer challenges, considering that scientific publications
and innovations are routinely protected, the protection of the former can
become quite controversial. Notwithstanding this controversy, there is
still no easy way to determine when knowledge constitutes or becomes an
innovation.
Apart from these four sets of highly challenging questions, the debate
on indigenous knowledge, innovations, and practices has been compli-
cated by the plight and historical mistreatment of traditional and indige-
crimination & Prot. of Minorities, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Discrimina-
tion Against Indigenous Peoples: Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual
Property of Indigenous Peoples, $1 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/28 (July 28, 1993) (pre-
pared by Erica-Irene Daes) [hereinafter Working Group Study] ("For indigenous peoples,
heritage is a bundle of relationships, rather than a bundle of economic rights. The 'object'
has no meaning outside of the relationship, whether it is a physical object such as a sacred
site or ceremonial tool, or an intangible such as a song or story. To sell it is necessarily to
bring the relationship to an end.").
186. See Peter K. Yu, Cultural Relics, Intellectual Property, and Intangible Heritage, 81
Ti-MI,. L. Rr.v. 433, 463-71 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Cultural Relics] (discussing compensa-
tion and benefit sharing as two underlying objectives of the efforts to protect intangible
cultural heritage); see also Convention on Biological Diversity art. 8(j), opened for signa-
ture June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (requiring member states to "encourage the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and
practices").
187. As Professor Daes explained in her study for the United Nations Working Group
on Indigenous Populations:
Indigenous peoples have always had their own laws and procedures for pro-
tecting their heritage and for determining when and with whom their heri-
tage can be shared. The rules can be complex and they vary greatly among
different indigenous peoples. To describe these rules thoroughly would be an
almost impossible task; in any case, each indigenous people must remain free
to interpret its own system of laws, as it understands them.
Working Group Study, supra note 185, 9 27; see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectiv-
ity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARrozo ARIS
& ENT. L.J. 175, 204-05 (2000) ("[F]or a tribe, determining the destiny of collective prop-
erty, particularly that which is sacred and intended solely for use and practice within the
collective, is a crucial element of self-determination."); Yu, Cultural Relics, supra note 186,
487-88 (discussing the importance of self-determination).
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nous communities. 188 Many international or regional instruments, for
example, have called for granting special protection to these communi-
ties. Article 31(1) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted in September 2007, states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional
cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences,
technologies and cultures, including human and genetic resources,
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora,
oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and
visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, con-
trol, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cul-
tural heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural
expressions. 189
Likewise, General Comment No. 17 declared: "States parties should
adopt measures to ensure the effective protection of the interests of in-
digenous peoples relating to their productions, which are often expres-
sions of their cultural heritage and traditional knowledge."' 190 Paralleling
the UNDRIP language, General Comment No. 21 stipulated:
Indigenous peoples have the right to act collectively to ensure re-
spect for their right to maintain, control, protect and develop their
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural ex-
pressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies
and cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds,
medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral tradi-
tions, literature, designs, sports and traditional games, and visual and
performing arts. States parties should respect the principle of free
prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters cov-
ered by their specific rights.1 9'
In sum, as far as indigenous knowledge, innovations and practices are
concerned, complete information about the different layers of the human
right framework remains unavailable. While the UNDRIP, the ICESCR,
and other intergovernmental documents indicate that the production
layer includes indigenous knowledge, innovations, and practices, it re-
mains unclear what interests the interest layer will cover. Some indige-
nous communities will certainly recognize the existence of both moral
and material interests. Others, however, may consider inappropriate the
emphasis on the latter, especially in regard to sacred knowledge, innova-
tions, and practices. 192 Some indigenous communities may also be willing
188. See Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 1 56 ("Intel-
lectual property regimes have historically failed to take into account the unique concerns
of indigenous peoples.").
189. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 31(1), G.A.
Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
190. General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 1 32.
191. General Comment No. 21, supra note 72, 1 37.
192. As Thomas Greaves explained:
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to strike a compromise between stronger material protection and weaker
moral recognition if they do not foresee any success in obtaining mean-
ingful protection for the latter.
To make the analysis even more difficult, the protection layer remains
widely undetermined. Despite more than a decade and a half of interna-
tional negotiations,' 93 the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intel-
lectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore has yet to come up with a formal international instrument, or
instruments, to address the protection layer. Although the Committee
submitted the draft texts of three separate instruments-on genetic re-
sources, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions-for
consideration by the WIPO General Assembly in September 2014,194 the
WIPO member states failed to agree on a work program concerning this
Committee. 195 The Committee's work was temporarily suspended in
early 2015 and did not resume until its mandate was renewed at the 2015
WIPO General Assembly.' 96
The control of traditional ideas and knowledge ... identifies places, customs
and beliefs which, if publicly known, will destroy parts of a people's cultural
identity. Sometimes it is knowledge entrusted only to properly prepared re-
ligious specialists. Disclosure to other, unqualified members destroys it.
Sometimes it is knowledge shared among all of a society's members, but not
with outsiders. Such knowledge charters a society's sense of self; to disclose it
loosens the society's self-rationale.
Tom Greaves, IPR, A Current Survey, in INTELLEC-rUAL PizOPERTY RIGIHTs FOR INDIGE-
NOUS PE'oiiiEs, A SOURCEIBOOK 1, 4 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994); see also Sarah Harding,
Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage, 31 Aiuz. ST. L. 291, 314 (1999) ("[S]ecrecy is an
integral part of the sacredness of certain objects, stories, songs or rituals, and as such,
instrumental in maintaining a certain social structure within the cultural group. [It] helps
protect rituals and customs from destructive external forces." (footnote omitted)); Angela
R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on Rights and
Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & Pun. PoL'y 155, 159 (2004) (noting the challenge of pro-
tecting sacred and confidential information); Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Cul-
tural Products, 81 B.U. L. Riv. 793, 829-30 (2001) (discussing how newspaper
photographer "violated and upset the Pueblo's balance of life" by taking photographs of
ceremonial dance while flying at low altitude over Pueblo of Santo Domingo).
193. Established in September 2000, the Committee sought to explore "the develop-
ment of an international legal instrument or instruments for the effective protection of
traditional cultural expressions and traditional knowledge, and to address the intellectual
property aspects of access to and benefit-sharing in genetic resources." WIPO, Traditional
Knowledge, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/ [https://perma.cc/B3BH-5XAF].
194. See Catherine Saez, Protection of Folklore Joins TK, GR on Way to WIPO General
Assembly, IN'r1-L.. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/04/07/pro-
tection-of-folklore-joins-tk-gr-on-way-to-wipo-general-assembly/ [https://perma.cc/8SQQ-
M674].
195. See Catherine Saez & William New, Inauspicious Start to Gurry's Second Term as
IP Policymaking Hits Wall at WIPO, INTELI. PROP. WATCH . (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2014/10/01 /inauspicious-start-to-gurrys-second-term-as-ip-policymaking-hits-
wall-at-wipo/ [https://perma.cc/HZJ4-FSKK] ("The longstanding discussions at the Inter-
governmental Committee on Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(IGC), which have divided member states on how to protect traditional knowledge, genetic
resources and traditional cultural expressions (folklore) did not find any conclusion during
the General Assembly.").
196. See Catherine Saez and William New, WIPO Assembly Extends Talks on Tradi-
tional Knowledge, Design; Sets Policy for New Offices, IN-nLL. PiRoP. WATCi (Oct. 15,
2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/10/15/wipo-assembly-extends-talks-on-traditional-
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS BASIS
When the human rights framework for intellectual property is being
explored, commentators have suggested that the human right basis for
intellectual property protection does not have to originate, or originate
solely, from the right to the protection of interests resulting from intellec-
tual productions. Instead, an alternative (or supplemental) human rights
basis can be derived from the right to own private property. It is there-
fore no surprise that the Special Rapporteur's recent report on copyright
policy recalled the recurring debate concerning whether this right can
provide "[a]n alternative human rights basis for intellectual property
protection."' 97
Moreover, recent human rights developments in Europe support the
use of the right to own private property to provide an alternative human
rights basis for intellectual property protection. For instance, in
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal,198 the Grand Chamber of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights extended the protection of "the peaceful
enjoyment of ... possessions" in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights' 9 9 to cover both registered trade-
marks and trademark applications of a multinational corporation.
Intellectual property is also explicitly covered in the right to property
provision in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union,2 ° which entered into force in December 2009201 fol-
lowing the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union.2 02
While I am aware of these developments in Europe and understand
why policymakers, commentators, and intellectual property industries are
eager to push for an alternative human rights basis for intellectual prop-
erty protection, I remain unconvinced that the right to own private prop-
erty would provide a satisfactory basis. 20 3 First, the norms articulated in
knowledge-design-sets-policy-for-new-offices/ [https://perma.cc/D58S-P5CW] (reporting
"World Intellectual Property Organization members agreed to continue working in com-
mittee toward an international agreement or agreements on the protection of traditional
knowledge, genetic resources and folklore, rescuing the committee for another two
years").
197. Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Policy, supra note 11, 52.
198. 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2007) (Grand Chamber).
199. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 ("Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.").
200. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17(2), Dec. 7,
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 ("Intellectual property shall be protected.").
201. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GEN-
IERAL FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 11, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/
indexen.htm [https://perma.cc/XN8P-V9PL].
202. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
203. See Jakob Cornides, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Conver-
gence, 7 J. WORLD INTEI. PROP. 135, 145-49 (2004) (exploring whether intellectual prop-
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the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union are regional by nature; they
neither reflect an international consensus nor have universal appeal. 20 4
Second, for many human rights experts, including CESCR members and
the Special Rapporteur, it is problematic that the European Court of
Human Rights extended human rights protection beyond individuals to
cover corporations, such as Anheuser-Busch, Inc.205 Third, although the
right to own private property focuses mostly on the material interests re-
sulting from intellectual productions, it does not satisfactorily protect the
equally important moral interests resulting from these productions.2 06
Indeed, serious complications arise when intellectual property rights
are subsumed under the right to own private property. In general, those
relying on this right to advocate the protection of intellectual property
rights as human rights make their claims based on the following
syllogism:
Premise 1: Intellectual property rights are rights to own private
property.
erty is the same as property in tangible assets); Yu, Ten Common Questions, supra note 7,
at 731-36 (exploring whether "the right to private property already provides adequate pro-
tection to the interests in intellectual creations").
204. See Daniel J. Gervais, How Intellectual Property and Human Rights Can Live To-
gether: An Updated Perspective, in INTm IAECTUAI_ PROI'ERTY AND) HUMAN RiGTirs, supra
note 4, at 3, 4 [hereinafter Gervais, Intellectual Property and Human Rights] ("One might
disagree with the assertion that private property rights are human rights-at least in a
universal conception.").
205. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 7 ("[O]nly the 'author', namely the
creator, whether man or woman, individual or group of individuals, of scientific, literary or
artistic productions, such as, inter alia, writers and artists, can be the beneficiary of the
protection of article 15, paragraph 1(c). . . . Under the existing international treaty protec-
tion regimes, legal entities are included among the holders of intellectual property rights.
However,... their entitlements, because of their different nature, are not protected at the
level of human rights." (footnote omitted)); Special Rapporteur's Report on Copyright Pol-
icy, supra note 11, 41 ("Corporate rights holders play an essential role in the cultural
economy. They innovate ways of delivering cultural works to consumers, provide income
to artists, offer much-needed capital to finance high-budget cultural productions and can
free artists from many of the burdens of commercializing their work. Nonetheless, their
economic interests do not enjoy the status of human rights."); id. $ 99 ("The right to pro-
tection of authorship is the right of the human author(s) whose creative vision gave expres-
sion to the work. Corporate right holders must not be presumed to speak for the interests
of authors."); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN Riouis IN THEORY AND) PRACTICl 25(2d ed. 2003) ("Collectivities of all sorts have many and varied rights. But these are not-
cannot be-human rights, unless we substantially recast the concept."). See generally Yu,
Nonmultilateral Era, supra note 10, at 1066-70 (discussing whether corporate rights holders
can possess human rights).
206. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 20, 1 15 ("The protection of 'material
interests' of authors in article 15, paragraph I (c), reflects the close linkage of this provision
with the right to own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and in regional human rights instruments, as well as with the right of anyworker to adequate remuneration (art. 7 (a))."); Heifer, New Innovation Frontier?, supra
note 3, at 17 (noting the disagreement among scholars over whether the protection in Arti-
cle 1 of Protocol No. I to the European Convention of Human Rights extends to moral
rights); Yu, Ten Common Questions, supra note 7, at 732 (noting that the moral interests
that "'safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between peo-ples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage' and is generally
considered outside the coverage of the right to private property").
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Premise 2: The rights to own private property are human rights.
Conclusion: Intellectual property rights are therefore human rights.
The problem with this logic is that, if either Premise 1 or Premise 2 fails,
the conclusion that intellectual property rights are human rights will not
follow. Even worse, as shown below, there is a strong likelihood that not
only one premise will fail, but that both premises will fail-not to mention
that many continue to question whether intellectual property rights (in
the first premise) should exist in the first place.20 7
Part IV.A focuses on the first premise. It discusses how intellectual
property rights are not always private property rights or subsumed under
the right to own property. It also recalls two recent developments in the
copyright arena that have deemphasized property ownership and there-
fore put property rights advocates at odds with intellectual property in-
dustries. Part IV.B targets the second premise. It shows why it remains
problematic to claim the recognition of the right to own private property
as a human right.
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
Policymakers, intellectual property industries and some commentators
have equated intellectual property rights with private property rights. As
two advocates of strong property rights declared:
[Intellectual property] protection has long been recognized as a basic
human right, and the tension between the rights of the creators and
the rights of consumers has been successfully resolved by the devel-
opment and modification of intellectual property protections over
the years.
Those who want to weaken [intellectual property] protections are
really tapping into a failed and discredited economic theory that the
public doesn't benefit from privately owned goods. However, expro-
priation of others' property not only undermines creation and inven-
tion, it also undermines economies and societies. It is, ironically, one
of the most "anti-human rights" actions governments could take.208
Similar to these advocates, the entertainment industries have repeat-
edly condemned the unauthorized use of copyrighted materials as "theft"
and illegal file-sharers as "shoplifters. ' '20 9 According to Frances Preston,
207. See, e.g., MICHELE BO-RIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECIUAL MO-
NOPOLY (2008) (arguing that copyrights and patents are non-essential to creativity and
innovation and detrimental to the common good).
208. Tom Giovanetti & Merrill Matthews, Intellectual Property Rights and Human
Rights, IDEAS, Sept. 2005, http://www.ipi.org/ipi/IPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupFull
TextPDF/00393D8BI791936F862570EE00779CFC/$File/lPandHumanRights.pdf?OpenEle
ment [https://perma.cc/RE65-9U7N]; see also Robert L. Ostergard Jr., Intellectual Property:
A Universal Human Right?, 21 HUM. Rrs. Q. 156, 175 (1999) ("The basis for such a claim
without doubt lies in the Western conception of property rights.").
209. See Press Release, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Recording Industry to Begin
Collecting Evidence and Preparing Lawsuits Against File "Sharers" Who Illegally Offer
Music Online (June 25, 2003) (including quotes that described unauthorized use of copy-
righted materials as "theft" and illegal file-sharers as "shoplifters").
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the former president and CEO of Broadcast Music, Inc., a U.S. perform-
ing rights organization: "[I]llegal downloading of music is theft, pure and
simple. It robs songwriters, artists and the industry that supports them of
their property and their livelihood. '210 In an anti-piracy video featuring
vivid images of thefts and background music interlaced with police sirens,
the Motion Picture Association of America also declared, "You wouldn't
steal a car / You wouldn't steal a handbag / You wouldn't steal a televi-
sion / You wouldn't steal a movie / Downloading / Pirated / Films / Is
stealing / Stealing / Is against / The law / Piracy. It's a crime.1211
These efforts to equate intellectual property rights with private prop-
erty rights are both understandable and unsurprising. After all, copy-
rights, patents, trade secrets and many other forms of intellectual
property rights are protected as property rights. Nevertheless, the limited
scope and duration of intellectual property rights have led commentators
to distinguish these rights from what we traditionally conceive as prop-
erty rights. For example, Jakob Cornides questioned "whether intellectual
property corresponds to the classic concept of property-i.e. a plenary
and unlimited right to possess, use, exploit or destroy something, or to
grant or deny access to it-or whether it is a sui generis right fulfilling a
different purpose. '212 Daniel Gervais also noted that scholars have recog-
nized copyright not as an "ordinary" property, but "a 'hybrid property
right' or a 'transmuted right." 213 He went even further to suggest that,
"[b]y moving away from property, whether as a human right or as an
economic tool, copyright can transcend this debate and find a new, bal-
anced justification based on a human rights framework in which protec-
tion and access are seen as complementary objectives. '214
Moreover, not all intellectual property rights are protected under a
property-based regime. As noted earlier, such a regime does not provide
adequate protection to the moral interests resulting from intellectual pro-
ductions, such as those protected through moral rights or other non-eco-
210. Id. (quoting Frances Preston, former president and CEO of Broadcast Music,
Inc.). But see Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. CoL-o. L. REv.
653, 667-68 (2005) (discussing why the recording industry did not make the right analogy
when it compared individual file-sharers to shoplifters).
211. See Patricia Loughlan, "You Wouldn't Steal a Car. Intellectual Property and
the Language of Theft, 29 EUR. INTELL PIRoi. REV. 401, 401 (2007) (transcribing the text
of the commercial and discussing the rhetoric deployed). The commercial is widely availa-
ble on YouTube. See YouTUBE, http://www.yotube.com (last visited May 18, 2011) (ac-
cessed by searching for "MPAA Anti Piracy Ad").
212. Cornides, supra note 203, at 146.
213. Gervais, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, supra note 204, at 22 (footnote
omitted); see Christophe Geiger, Re-conceptualizing the Constitutional Dimension of Intel-
lectual Property, in INTELLECIUAL PROP'R'Y AND HUMAN Ric;HTs, supra note 4, at 115,
159 (suggesting that "intellectual property.., is a property of a special kind, which should
not be equated with physical property and which has to be considered as having an even
more limited nature than the latter"); Gervais, Human Rights, supra note 51, at 92-94
(discussing copyright as a trade right); Michel Vivant, Authors' Rights, Human Rights, 174
REVUE INTERNATIONALI DU Dizorr D'Auruiz 60, 84 (1997) (noting the potential "trans-
mutation" of copyright).
214. Gervais, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, supra note 204, at 22.
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nomic rights. Some intellectual property rights, such as trademarks, also
do not fit well with a property-based regime; these rights are protected
mostly as entitlements against unfair competition. As the United States
Supreme Court declared a century ago in the seminal case of United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.:
There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but a part of
the broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular mark
grows out of its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to
designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to pro-
tect his good will against the sale of another's product as his; and it is
not the subject of property except in connection with an existing
business. 215
Thus, even if the right to own private property is used to support the
recognition of intellectual property rights as human rights, this right does
not provide support for all intellectual property rights. Those unsup-
ported rights will still need an alternative human rights basis, such as
what is provided by the right to the protection of interests resulting from
intellectual productions. It is worth recalling that the UDHR, the
ICESCR, and other international or regional human rights instruments
neither endorse nor reject the use of property-based models to protect
interests resulting from intellectual productions. Instead, these instru-
ments merely identify two distinct interests that are covered by the right
to the protection of interests resulting from intellectual productions:
moral and material interests.
To complicate matters even further, two recent developments in the
copyright arena have deemphasized property ownership. In a surprising
turn of events, these developments have put property rights advocates at
odds with intellectual property industries. The first development involves
the U.S. Copyright Office's most recent rulemaking proceeding concern-
ing the anti-circumvention provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998 (DMCA).2 16 In its submission arguing against the introduc-
tion of exceptions in Class 21 for "vehicle software-diagnosis, repair, or
modification," John Deere claimed that those who purchased its tractors
did not have ownership interests in those vehicles; instead, they merely"receive[d] an implied license for the life of the vehicle to operate the
vehicle, subject to any warranty limitations, disclaimers or other contrac-
tual limitations in the sales contract or documentation. ' 217 Automobile
215. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
216. This triennial rulemaking proceeding aims to "determine whether users would be,
or are likely to be, 'adversely affected by the prohibition ... to make noninfringing uses ...
of a particular class of copyrighted works.'" Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircum-
vention, supra note 180, at 33.
217. Comments of Deere & Company to the U.S. Copyright Office, Exemption to Pro-
hibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technolo-
gies, at 6 (Mar. 27, 2015), http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715/class%2021/
JohnDeereClass2l1201_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZW5-KA6B]; see also Kyle Wiens,
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manufacturers also made similar arguments supporting the post-sale con-
trol of cars they produced. As General Motors stated in its submission,
those who own its cars do not own the computer software in the vehicles
even though such software, it admits, is essential to the vehicle's safe
operation.2 18
Although the arguments advanced by John Deere and General Motors
seem bizarre, they are somewhat understandable when viewed from the
manufacturers' self-interested perspectives. If the purchasers of the vehi-
cles managed to get unfettered property rights, as many car purchasers
certainly expected, it would be difficult for these manufacturers to justify
the post-sale deployment of technological protection measures to control
the use of the vehicles-the subject of the DMCA inquiry. Moreover, the
manufacturers do have valid concerns about the potential reputation
harms caused by safety issues that may arise when the vehicle's software
is inappropriately modified. It is therefore not difficult to understand why
car manufacturers are eager to use technological protection measures to
prevent vehicle owners from tinkering with the software inside the pur-
chased car.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this article, the arguments advanced
by John Deere and General Motors have greatly undermined the prop-
erty rights rhetoric that intellectual property industries have repeatedly
deployed. If car or tractor purchasers can no longer own vehicles, or the
essential software that operate those vehicles, what does it mean when
the motion picture industry analogizes movie downloading to car
theft? 219 Is the industry trying to suggest that downloading movies is as
complicated as stealing vehicles that buyers may or may not be able to
own? Or has the property right in vehicles dramatically evolved in recent
years to the point that these rights are now different from those impli-
cated by movie downloading?
We Can't Let John Deere Destroy the Very Idea of Ownership, WmiHi3, Apr. 21,2015, http:/
/www.wired.com/2015/04/dmca-ownership-john-deere/ [https://perma.cc/G R5C-NSU R]
(reporting about John Deere's submission).
218. See Comments of General Motors LLC to the U.S. Copyright Office, Exemption
to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, at 10 (Mar. 27, 2015), http://copyright.gov/1201/2015/comments-032715class
%2021/GeneralMotorsClass2l1201 _2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVU6-VWQ4] ("Propo-
nents incorrectly conflate ownership of a vehicle with ownership of the underlying com-
puter software in a vehicle."). But see Mike Masnick, GM Says That While You May Own
Your Car, It Owns the Software in It, Thanks to Copyright, Ti CIIDJRT (Apr. 23, 2015, 4:01
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles20150421/23581430744/gm-says-that-while-you-
may-own-your-car-it-owns-software-it-thanks-to-copyright.shtml [https://perma.cc/KQM8-
LKF5] ("[T]he real conflation here is by GM, John Deere, and others, in thinking that
because they hold a copyright to some software, that somehow gives them ownership over
what you do with the copy you legally purchased with the car itself.").
219. To make this analogy work, let us temporarily forget that nobody has ever
downloaded a car. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13 VAND.
J. ENT. & TFCii. L. 881, 892 (2011) ("Given the[] significant differences between tangible
and intangible property, it is no surprise that nobody has ever downloaded a car."); see also
Loughlan, supra note 211, at 402 ("The use of the language of theft in the discourse of
intellectual property ought at least to be constantly noted for what it is, that is, an inaccu-
rate and manipulative distortion of legal and moral reality.").
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Moreover, if most people do not acquire property rights in things they
purchased and only a minority few can have these rights, why are prop-
erty rights socially expedient? More importantly to our discussion, why
should the right to own private property be recognized as a human right?
As British delegate Freda Corbet rightly observed during the drafting of
the UDHR, "[T]he declaration of human rights should be universal in
nature and only recognize general principles that were valid for all men
[and women]." 22 0 Similarly, British delegate Geoffrey Wilson and Indian
delegate Hansa Metha "felt that no special group should be singled out
for attention,"12 2 ' thus raising questions concerning whether human rights
protection should be recognized in a subclass of individuals-namely, au-
thors and other intellectual laborers. 22 2
Another troubling recent development that has eroded the mass appeal
of property rights is the increasing push away from property ownership to
distribution models that support only content access. For instance,
through the use of streaming platforms such as Apple Music, Pandora,
Spotify, and YouTube, consumers increasingly do not own digital copies
of copyrighted songs despite making continuous payments. Instead, they
merely acquire rights to access these songs based on a subscription plan
or a pay-per-access model.
While commentators, myself included, have widely questioned the ben-
efits of these platforms to professional songwriters,223 an oft-overlooked
question concerns whether the widespread use of these platforms will ul-
timately undermine the property rights rhetoric that intellectual property
industries have repeatedly deployed. After all, when most people no
longer own copies of songs, movies, or game software despite making
continuous payments, at some point these people will become confused
about the nature and justification of property ownership. Some may even
begin to question the legitimacy of property rights.
Worse still, the recent move from property ownership to access-based
models has greatly alienated a core group of supporters that have consist-
ently and continuously stood on the side of the intellectual property in-
dustries in their quest for ever-strengthening levels of protection and
enforcement. To some extent, the position taken by these industries has
220. MORSINK, supra note 39, at 221.
221. Id. at 220.
222. See id. at 221 (recalling the observation of Australian delegate Alan Watt that "the
indisputable rights of the intellectual worker could not appear beside fundamental rights of
a more general nature, such as freedom of thought, religious freedom or the right to
work"); Chapman, Core Obligations, supra note 77, at 313 (stating that "other members of
the [UDHR] drafting committee claimed that special protection for intellectual property
entailed an elitist perspective").
223. See Peter K. Yu, How Copyright Law Could Affect Pop Music Without Our Know-
ing It, 83 UMKC L. Riv. 363, 372-78 (2014) (discussing why professional songwriters re-
main dissatisfied with Pandora and Spotify); Peter K. Yu, What Apple's New Music
Streaming Service Will Mean for Underpaid Songwriters, THiE CONVERSATION (June 17,
2015), https://theconversation.com/what-apples-new-music-streaming-service-will-mean-
for-underpaid-songwriters-42230 [https://perma.cc/RGM9-KBVV] (expressing skepticism
that Apple Music will generate more revenue for professional songwriters).
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suggested their wrongful belief that their intellectual property has given
them what Cynthia Ho described as "iber rights" 224-rights that trump
other rights, such as the purchasers' property rights. This concept is highly
dangerous from a human rights standpoint because it may eventually cre-
ate the misimpression that these rights also trump individual human
rights.
B. PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
The second premise concerns the recognition of the right to own prop-
erty as a human right. Those who call for using this right to provide an
alternative basis for intellectual property protection tend to commit to a
specific conception of property rights-that is, the right to own private
property. Although the need for and benefit of this right cannot be more
obvious in liberal societies, it remains debatable how much of this specific
right has been recognized in existing international or regional human
rights instruments.
Due to Cold War politics and concerns raised by Socialist countries,
neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor the
ICESCR includes a provision on the right to own private property.22 5
There was also no evidence that the delegates agreed to provide special
recognition to property rights resulting from intellectual productions.
Even today, more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, it
remains unclear whether countries will readily agree to a new provision
on such a right.226 Thus, the text of the ICESCR and its drafting history
suggest that the right to own private property has not achieved interna-
tional consensus and that the right protected in Article 15(1)(c) should
exist independently of the right to own property.
The only major international human right instrument that contains the
right to own property is the UDHR. Although this instrument does not
have the same legal effect as the ICESCR, it is important because many
commentators consider that the UDHR has achieved the status of cus-
tomary international law.227 Specifically, Article 17 of the UDHR states:
224. CYNTI-IA M. Ho, AccEss TO MEIIC1NE IN TI-I GI-O3At ECONOMY: INTE1RNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATD Ricrtrs 163-66 (2011) (discussing pat-
ent as an "tiber right").
225. See Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1085
n.179.
226. Nevertheless, as Graeme Austin suggested to the Author a few years ago when the
latter began exploring the development of the human rights framework for intellectual
property, the holistic approach adopted in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples may provide some helpful hints about how the right to property may
be addressed in a post-cold-war environment. See UNDRIP, supra note 189.
227. See JOHN P. HUMPHIimEY, HUMAN Rio ri's & THE UNIT) NATIONS: A GREAT An-
VENTURE 75-76 (1984) (providing evidence that the UDHR "is now part of the customary
law of nations"); Claude, supra note 38, at 252 ("[A]fter fifty years, the Universal Declara-
tion . . . has begun to take on the qualities of 'customary international law."'); Torremans,
supra note 74, at 227 ("[W]here initially Member States were not obliged to implement
[the Declaration on the basis that it is merely aspirational or advisory in nature], it has now
gradually acquired the status of customary international law and of the single most authori-
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(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in asso-
ciation with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.228
The specific language of this provision is important. As much as prop-
erty rights advocates want to argue otherwise, this provision does not
unambiguously protect the right to own private property. 22 9 Due to con-
cerns similar to those raised by the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc
countries during the drafting of the ICESCR as well as a strong push by
Latin American countries during the drafting of the UDHR, the dele-
gates eventually reached a compromise by omitting the word "private"
and then including the phrase "alone as well as in association with
others. '230 As Mary Ann Glendon recounted:
The United States strongly supported a right to own private property
and to be protected against public taking of private property without
due safeguards. The United Kingdom's Labour government repre-
sentatives, however, took the position that the article should be
omitted, arguing that regulation of property rights was so extensive
everywhere in the modern world that it made no sense to speak of a
right to ownership. Many Latin Americans took an entirely different
tack: they wanted the article to specify a right to enough private
property for a decent existence. The Soviets, for their part, objected
to the idea that a decent existence should be grounded in private
property and insisted that the article should take account of the dif-
ferent economic systems in various countries.2 31
In the end, Article 17(1) of the UDHR "omitt[ed] the word private,"
was reduced to "a high level of generality, '2 32 and "openly acknowl-
edge[d] both the capitalist and communist way of organizing a national
economy. '2 33 This provision now reads: "Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others. '234 While "the right
tative source of human rights norms."). See generally THEODOR MER.ON, HUMAN Rii-ris
ANi) HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989) (examining human rights and
humanitarian law in relation to the general principles of international law).
228. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17.
229. See Craig Scott, Multinational Enterprises and Emergent Jurisprudence on Viola-
tions of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
Rioirrs: A TEXI"BOOK 563, 564 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001) ("[Plost-war notions
of the redistributive role of modern states, as well as newly-decolonized states' reactions to
Western corporate power, meant that the right to property in its classical liberal form did
not survive as a self-standing right within a United Nations' human rights treaty order.").
230. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17(1).
231. MARY ANN GLIENDON, A WORLD MADE NFw: ELEANOR Roosivi LT AND TII'
UNIVERSAL DICAa ARATION 01 HUMAN RIGrrs 182 (2001); see also MORSINK, supra note
39, at 139-52 (discussing the drafting of the right to property provision); Chapman, Core
Obligations, supra note 77, at 314 ("The socialist bloc's opposition to property rights had
already played a major role in the decision of the Covenant's drafting committee not to
include the text of Article 17 of the UDHR recognising the right to tangible forms of
property in the Covenant.").
232. GLENDON, supra note 231, at 183.
233. MORSINK, supra note 39, at 147.
234. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17(1).
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to own property alone" undoubtedly provides a strong textual basis for
unqualified intellectual property rights, the "right to own property ... in
association with others" could provide a compelling textual basis for the
creation of a rich public domain and for unrestricted access to protected
materials if the word "others" refers to members of the public. 235 Be-
cause of these different possible interpretations, Article 17(1) is at best
ambiguous about whether the right to own private property provides the
basis for the right to the protection of material interests resulting from
intellectual productions in Article 27(2).
Compared with the UDHR, the ICCPR, and the ICESCR, the regional
instruments have offered more explicit protection to the right to own pri-
vate property. For example, Article 28 of the American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man states that "[e]very person has a right to
own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living
and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home. '236
Nevertheless, as Chilean delegate Hernan Santa Cruz elaborated on this
particular provision during the UDHR drafting process, "[o]wnership of
anything more than [what is required by this language] might not be con-
sidered a basic right. '237 The right to the protection of interests resulting
from intellectual productions therefore does not include the protection of
interests that are generally not required to meet the essential needs of
decent living and to maintain human dignity.
In sum, although virtually all countries now protect the right to own
private property, it is questionable that this right has been recognized as a
human right in the UDHR, the ICCPR, or the ICESCR. It is even more
dubious that international human rights instruments require the protec-
tion of a property-based intellectual property regime, as opposed to a
regime that recognizes the existence of a robust and rich public domain.
While the former is supported by "the right to own property alone" in
235. This conception of the public domain stands in sharp contrast to the one that views
the public domain as "a residual category of material that for various reasons is not pro-
tected by a property right." Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71
U. Cin. L. REV. 183, 184 n.2 (2004); see also Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in
Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 137, 137 (1993) (exploring whether the
public domain is "simply whatever is left over after various tests of legal protection have
been applied").
236. American Declaration, supra note 36, art. 23. Known as the Bogotd Declaration
and adopted shortly after the Second World War, this Declaration influenced the drafting
of the UDHR. See Claude, supra note 38, at 251 ("Attachment to [the American Declara-
tion] language helped to ensure that the Latin American delegates were unified in their
voting against strong opposition from Soviet allies."); Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property Interests, supra note 13, at 1055 (discussing how the French delegates' incorpora-
tion of the language from the American Declaration into the draft Article 27 of the UDHR
flattered the delegates from Chile and Uruguay, leading to their immediate support of the
proposed language).
237. MORSINK, supra note 39, at 145; see also JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF
HUMAN RiGi-irs: PIIILOSOPHICAI. REFLECTIONS ON TIIE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF
HUMAN RIGTrs 100 (1987) (denying that "there is a good case on moral grounds for a
secure claim to property rights in land and other major productive resources" and that "the
expropriation of such property, when it does not threaten one's ability to obtain the neces-
sities of life, is a violation of human rights").
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Article 17 of the UDHR, the latter can be supported by "the right to own
property ... in association with others," a right that the provision also
expressly recognizes. 238
CONCLUSION
This article highlights the complex interactions among scientific pro-
ductions, intellectual property, and human rights. Not only does it explain
why only some aspects of intellectual property rights (including patent
rights) can be recognized as human rights, it also advances a layered ap-
proach to intellectual property and human rights. This approach aims to
foster a better understanding of the structure of the human rights frame-
work for intellectual property as well as the interactions between and
among the framework's different structural layers.
It is my hope that this article will facilitate a more systematic and holis-
tic study of this framework and a more sophisticated understanding of the
interplay of intellectual property and human rights. Although this article
focuses primarily on scientific productions, the proposed layered ap-
proach and its analysis is likely to apply equally well to literary or artistic
productions. The approach and analysis will therefore enable us to go
beyond the usual debates on the human rights limits to intellectual prop-
erty rights, intellectual property and human rights, and intellectual prop-
erty as human rights.
Taking the establishment of the human rights framework for intellec-
tual property as its starting point, this article identifies the framework's
different organizational principles and structural layers. It also explores
how the different layers interact with each other in the context of scien-
tific productions. In doing so, the article seeks to advance a new approach
that will be applicable to all forms of intellectual productions-be they
literary, artistic, or scientific.
238. UDHR, supra note 19, art. 17(1). One may wonder whether this language refers to
what intellectual property commentators generally discuss in the context of joint author-
ship. However, the drafting history of the UDHR has shown otherwise.
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